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INTRODUCTION.— It will be shown in this contribution that the Received View
on Zeno’s paradoxical arguments is untenable. Upon a close analysis of the Greek
sources1, it is possible to do justice to Simplicius’s widely neglected testimony, where
he states: In his book, in which many arguments are put forward, he shows in each that
a man who says that there is a plurality is stating something contradictory [DK 29B 2].
Thus we will demonstrate that an underlying structure common to both the Paradoxes
of Plurality (PP) and the Paradoxes of Motion (PM) shores up all his arguments.2 This
structure bears on a correct — Zenonian — interpretation of the concept of “division
through and through”, which takes into account the often misunderstood Parmenidean
legacy, summed up concisely in the deictical dictum τo8 ǫ’o8 ν ǫ’′στι : “the Being-Now
is”.3 The feature, generally overlooked but a key to a correct understanding of all the
arguments based on Zeno’s divisional procedure, is that they do not presuppose space,
nor time. Division merely requires extension of an object present to the senses and takes
place simultaneously. This holds true for both PP and PM! Another feature in need of
rehabilitation is Zeno’s plainly avered but by others blatantly denied phaenomenolog-
ical — better: deictical — realism. Zeno nowhere denies the reality of plurality and
change. Zeno’s arguments are not a reductio, if only because the logical prejudice that
1The reference textcritical edition for the fragments [B] and related testimonia [A] is: H. Diels and W.
Kranz [DK in what follows. See the list of sigla at the end of this paper], Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, to the
numbering of which I will comply in accordance with scholarly tradition.
2In this we reckon in Owen a precursor, although our analysis of Zeno’s arguments will be very different
from his. See G.E.L. Owen, “Zeno and the mathematicians”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 8, 1957.
3K. Riezler, Parmenides. Text, ´Ubersetzung, Einfu¨hrung und Interpretation, Vittorio Klostermann, Frank-
furt, 1970, p. 45-50. Parmenides’s τo8 ǫ’ o8 ν ǫ’′στι [to eon esti] should indeed be translated as The Now-Being
is. In the present everything is. That the in origin dialectal difference between τo′ o’′ν and τo8 ǫ’ o8 ν had ac-
quired philosophical significance becomes explicit in Diogenes of Appolonia, a contemporary to Zeno, where
τα
8
o’
′
ντα [ta onta; the beings] are stable essences, while τα8 ǫ’ o′ ντα νυaν [ta eonta nun; the beings-now]
are instable phaenomenological things. See L. Couloubaritsis, La Physique d’Aristote, Ousia, Bruxelles,
1997, p. 308.
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something which implies paradoxes cannot “really be there” is itself still unthinkable,
since hypothetical thinking does not yet exist. When one speaks, one does so not about
a possible world, but about this world: κo′ σµoς τo′ δǫ as Heraclitus calls her [DK 22B
30].4 Zeno merely shows that, when someone states plurality, he inevitably states a
contradiction, exactly as Simplicius claims. In what are traditionally considered the
plurality arguments, this contradiction appears in the stature of µǫ′ γαλα και8 µικρα8 ,
the large[s]-and-small[s] [DK 29B 1]. After subsuming PM under the simultaneous di-
visional procedure proper to PP, it will be indicated how the received view on the
former can easely be derived by the introduction of time as a (non-Zenonian) prae-
miss, thus causing their collaps into arguments which can be approached and refuted
by Aristotle’s limit-like concept of the “potentially infinite”, which remained — in dif-
ferent disguises — at the core of the refutational strategies that have been in use up
to the present. A mathematical representation will be given for Zeno’s simultaneous
divisional procedure which fully reckons Aristotle’s dictum, revealingly enough never
discussed in relation to Zeno, where he says: For in two ways it can be said that a dis-
tance or a period or any other continuum is infinite, viz., with respect to the partitions
or with respect to the parts [Phys. Z, 2, 263a (24-26)].
ZENO’S INFINITE DIVISION AND THE PARADOXES OF PLURALITY.— I said that
the sources testify for the unity of Zeno’s arguments, in that they ALL are arguments on
plurality. In this paragraph we are going to read in some detail the fragments which are
seen traditionally as the paradoxes of plurality, in order to understand how Zeno gets to
his plurality and what he has in mind when he uses that term. A comment by Simplicius
will serve as our guideline: κατα8 τo8 πληaθoς α’′πǫιρoν ǫ’κ τηa ς διχoτoµι′ ας ǫ’′δǫιξǫ
[Thus] he demonstrated numerical infinity by means of dichotomy. [Phys., 140 (27)].
Three observations are in order here. First, the verbal form of the main clause is not
neutral with regard to Zeno’s achievement: the conjugation used is ǫ’′δǫιξǫ , the (3rd
sing.) aorist of δǫικνυ′ ναι [deiknunai] (‘to point at, to indicate’; here in the sense of
‘to show’,‘to demonstrate’), so as to mark out unambiguously that Zeno demonstrated
this once and for all, exactly as when we speak of “Go¨del’s proof” as an acquired,
definite result. Second, the word apeiron, customary translated as ‘infinity’, occurs in
Zeno’s own tekst and means literally ‘unbounded’. It derives from the archaic a-peirar;
with πǫιaραρ : rope, knot or bond5, i.e., something that has to be put around or upon
something else from the outside, not just an end or a limit which is intrinsic to it. It is
rather like a fence enclosing a meadow. Okeanos, the primal sea, is said to be apeiron;
the image here being that of a lonely ship (the Earth) in the middle of a sea with no
land in sight. So when used to qualify an abstract entity or process, the connotation
will be ‘not stopped by somebody or something, uninterrupted’. One will be reminded
of the ‘bonds of Necessity’ invoked by Parmenides in his Poem [DK 28B 8 (30)]. Third
and last, the word διχoτoµι′α [dichotomy] does not occur in Zeno’s own text, and we
know that this is not for want of relevant text pieces. How then do we know that Zeno
has in view such a division? We will see in a minute why the procedure Zeno describes
4Conche translates “ce monde-ci”. M. Conche, He´raclite. Fragments, Presses Universitaires de France,
1986/1998, pp. 279-280.
5R.B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1951[1994],
p. 314-317; 332 sq.
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in his text cannot be anything else than a ‘division through and through’. But there are
other, related testimonies. A fragment ascribed by Porphyry to Parmenides does men-
tion διαι′ρǫτoν [division] explicitly. Simplicius [Phys., 140 (21)] points out that this
attribution must be fallacious: For no such arguments figure among the Parmenidean
[texts] and the majority of our information refers the difficulty from dichotomy to Zeno.
This is confirmed by Philoponus [In Physica 80(26-27)].6 In the Porphyry text it is stip-
ulated: since it is alike throughout πα′ ντη
ι
[pante¯i], if it is divisible, it will be divisible
throughout alike, not just here but not there.7 The relevance of the words ‘here’‘and
‘there’ cannot be overestimated, for in Zenonian terms they serve to deictically define
extension. Simplicius moreover adds: There is no need to labour the point; for such an
argument is to be found in Zeno’s own book. (...) Zeno writes the following words (...)8;
after which follows a literal quotation:
The second Paradox of Plurality (infinite divisibility) [DK 29B 3]9
[Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum, 140 (27)] For in his proof that,
if there is plurality, the same things are both finite and infinite, Zeno writes
the following words: “if they are many [things], they by necessity are as
many as they are, not more nor less. But if they are as many as they are,
they will be finite [bounded, peperasmena]. But if they are many, they will
be infinite [unbounded, apeiron]. For there will always [aei] be others
[hetera] in between [metaxu] of the beings, and there again others in be-
tween.” Thus he demonstrated infinity by means of dichotomy.
It is remarkable that Simplicius is so firm in his statement, while we would be tempted
to find the argument at first glance rather weak. Remember Simplicius’s introduction:
he shows in each [argument] that a man who says there is a plurality is stating some-
thing contradictory. The contradiction apparently is that if “they are many, they will
be both bounded and unbounded”. Whence does this contradiction arise? The point is
clearly somewhere in the sentence: For there will always be others in between of the
beings, and there again others in between. Even if not mentioned explicitly, this cannot
be other than some kind of divisional procedure, exactly as we conceive of fractions
to mentally break a line. Zeno’s plurality-argument constitutes the first Gedanken-
experiment in scientific history! It furthermore states in an accurate way that the
6LEE, p. 22. S. Makin, “Zeno on Plurality” Phronesis, 27, 1982, pp. 223-238, gives Themistius’s com-
mentary on the Physics as further evidence. I follow Vlastos for the emendation of the word “texts” in the
fragment quoted; VLAS, p. 231. But even if the fragment were Parmenidean, it would not lose its rele-
vance, given the close doctrinal relationship between the two men; so W.E. Abraham, “The nature of Zeno’s
Argument Against Plurality in [DK 29B 1]”, Phronesis, , 17, 1972, pp. 40-52.
7VLAS, p. 229; LEE, pp. 12, 20-23. A close parallel to this argument can be found in Aristotle’s book on
becoming, [De gen. et cor., I. 2, 316a16 sq. and 325 a8].
8See LEE, p. 21 (the source of the translation). Compare DK p. 257, ftn. 5 with [DK 28B 8 (22)].
9Concerning the translation of Zeno’s arguments: I made use of LEE, KRS and other sources to be
mentioned in case, but nowhere I follow them completely, sometimes — I admit — to the detriment of
the English used. This is because I chose to contract O’Flaherty’s methodological advise (in her book on
sexual metaphor in Ancient Indian mythology) as completely as possible: In the first analysis, it pays to
be literal-minded. W.D. O’Flaherty, Women, Androgynes and other mythical Beasts, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 5. I can only hope the reader will be indulgent with respect to this choice.
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number of parts obtained should at least be dense, in the mathematical sense of that
word.10 To be sure, this also means that atoms as straightforward “least parts” are
non-Zenonian. It makes moreover plain that ‘being (un)bounded’ really means ‘being
(un)limited in number’. I am running a bit ahead of my argument when I say that this
implies as well that they are at least countably infinite. We already know that limitation
comes about by something external, by an obstacle or by interruption of an ongoing
process. It inevitably follows that Zeno had in mind a division which is both symmetri-
cal and nondirected, i.e. one in which all parts undergo the same divisional process.11
Zeno’s terminology speaks for itself, as both µǫταξυ′ [metaxu] ‘amidst’, ‘in between
equal parts or things’ and ǫ‘′τǫρα [hetera] ‘others’, where the singular heteron indicates
‘the other of two’, testify. With regard to the latter Diels-Kranz put it plain and simple
in their apparatus: ǫ‘′τǫρoν : Dichotomie!12
Thus for anyone sharing the terminological sensitivity that goes along with having
ancient Greek as a mothertongue, Zeno’s intentions were immediately clear. But we do
still not know why applying this procedure would amount into paradoxical results. To
answer this question, we have to extract more information from another variant of the
argument, known as the ‘first’ paradox of plurality, because in it the intended situation
is even more explicitly exposed:
The first Paradox of Plurality (finite extension) [DK 29B 1 & B 2]
[Simpl., Phys, 140 (34)] The infinity of magnitude he showed previ-
ously by the same reasoning; for, having first shown that “if a being had
no magnitude, it would not be at all”, he proceeds “but if it is, then each
one must necessarily have some magnitude [megethos] and thickness and
keep one away [apechein heteron] from the other [apo heteron]. And the
same reasoning holds for any [part] jutting out [peri to prouchontos]; for
this too will have extended magnitude and jut out. But to say this once is
as good as saying it forever [aei]; for none will be the last [eschaton] nor
the one [heteron] will be unrelated to another one [pros heteron]. So if
it is a plurality, it by necessity will be many small [ones] and many large
[ones] [mikra kai megala] — µικρα8 τǫ ǫι’
a
ναι και
8
µǫ
′
γαλα — ; so many
small[s] as to have no magnitude [me¯ megethos], so many large[s] as to
be unbounded [apeiron]”.
[Simpl., Phys, 139 (5)] In one of these arguments he shows that if
there is plurality [polla], then it is both many large [ones] and many small
10I am not “reading this into” Zeno; his formulation is by far the closest you can get to it in words. Let’s
make the point by comparing him to a standard textbook definition: Let a and b be two real numbers with
a < b. We can always find a real number x between a and b. See K.G. Binmore, The Foundations of
Analysis: A straightforward Introduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 74. The point is
so obvious that one wonders why it is not made more often.
11However, there IS an unexpressed hypothesis crucial to Zeno’s procedure, namely that division be one-
dimensional, and in imagination presented as horizontal. This allows him to go over smoothly form PP to
PM, but it has non-innocent mathematical consequences, on which we will come back. The relevance of this
for the mathematics involved was pointed out to me by Bob Coecke (Oxford).
12DK, vol. I, p. 255.
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[ones]13, so many large[s] [megala] as be infinite [apeiron] in magnitude,
so many small[s] [mikra] as to have no magnitude at all. In this same
argument he shows that what is without magnitude, thickness and bulk
would not be at all. “For”, he says, “if it were added to some other being,
it would not make it bigger; because being of no magnitude, when added,
it cannot possibly make it grow in magnitude. And thus the added would
in fact be nothing. So if, when taken away, the other [being] will not be
any less, and again will not, when added, increase, then it is clear that the
added and then again taken away was nothing.”14
Our aim is to try to understand Zeno in the way he understood himself, so we will
follow Zeno’s own argumentation as closely as possible and try to avoid any assump-
tion imposed on him by later times. This explains my a bit awkward translation: the
precise use of singular verb forms and plural substantives in the description is essential
to a correct understanding, and should as much as possible be preserved. We already
found that Zeno must have had in mind some kind of division. From the first lines of
[DK 29B 1] it is clear that we are dealing with an object that has material extension; the
verb ‘proechein’ is normally said of contiguous parts, one of which is thought of as
sticking out from or extending beyond the other.15 Plurality is coined here in terms of
the relation between parts and whole in an extended object with a ‘here’ and a ‘there’:
The discrimination of any two such parts in any existent I shall refer to as a “divi-
sion”.16 The deictic “first person”17 standpoint manifest in the lacking of temporality
in Zeno’s present-ation apparently has a spatial counterpart. “Space” nor “time” exist
as independent backgrounds against wich a mentally representable event takes place18;
it is by indication that the validity of the argument is shown. Let us now see, on the
basis of these two fragments, what characterises this division, and join our conclusions
with those attained on the first fragment. There has been considerable controversy in
the literature on this subject. It is appropriate to follow here Abraham’s terminological
distinctions between bipartite and tripartite division, and between simple ‘division at
infinity’ and ‘division throughout’, i.e., stepwise applied to the last product of division
or applied to all obtained parts equally. The bipartite/tripartite controversy was settled
(methinks convincingly) by Vlastos. He argues for the symmetrical variant, offering,
apart from considerations on the impact of symmetrical proportion on the archaic mind,
a number of linguistic arguments, which strengthen the few we offered with regard to
[DK 29B 1]. The image he presents of Zeno’s procedure is the one now generally ac-
13I know of no translations which renders this sentence coorectly. The verb used is ǫ’ στι′ , “it is”, while
megala and mikra obviously are plurals. This moreover rules out the translation “they must be both small
and large” for the last sentence in [DK 29B 1], as for instance in LEE.
14The hesitation in the standard translations with respect to the last line seems unnecessary when one
takes one of the very few Aristotelian texts into account that deal explicitly with plurality — interestingly
enough in [Met. 1001b7-19], i.e., not in the Physics — and where an almost literal quotation of Zeno’s
words is present: For, he says, that which makes [something else] no larger, when added, and no smaller,
when subtracted, is not an existent. Translation with [ ]: VLAS, p. 238.
15VLAS, “Plurality”, p. 226.
16VLAS, “Plurality”, p. 226.
17E. Benve´niste, “Le langage et l’expe´rience humaine”, in: Proble`mes de linguistique ge´ne´rale II, Galli-
mard, Paris, 1966, p. 69.
18J. Bollack, H. Wismann, He´raclite ou la se´paration, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1972, p. 49.
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cepted: imagine a rod, divide it in two equal parts, take the right hand part, divide it
the same way, and repeate this procedure ad infinitum. One then obtains the physical
aequivalent of a mathematical sequence of geometrically decreasing parts. This is ex-
emplified in Vlastos’s translation of the clause πǫρι8 τoυa πρoυ′ χoντoς is “[And the
same reasoning applies] to the projecting [part]”, the part which remains to be further
divided, that is.
Zeno’s conclusion inevitably is that “a finite thing is infinite”, not a paradoxcical,
but a ridicoulous statement. The assertion then mostly follows that Zeno’s reasoning
is based on a lack of mathematical knowledge for it is evident, isn’t it, that the sum
of an infinite series can very well have a finite total. Vlastos, who is familiar with the
subtlety and profundity of Ancient Greek thought has the elegance at least to look for
other explanations of Zeno’s supposed blatant error.19 It is nevertheless true that on this
interpretation the unity of Zeno’s arguments is respected at least to the extend that two
of the four Zenonian paradoxes of motion can be subsumed under the same model, in
the received view on PM. Its major flaw with respect to at least PP is, however, that it
cannot be upheld, because, 1) the density-property explicitly mentioned in [DK 29B 3]
remains unexplained; 2) the Porphyry text gives terminological evidence in favour of
a ‘division throughout’: since it is everywhere [pante¯i] homogeneous, if it is divisible,
it will be divisible everywhere [pante¯i] alike20; and 3) an essential part of the claim
stated in [DK 29B 1] is not taken into account. Therein it is said that if it is a plurality, it
by necessity will be many small [ones] and large [ones]; so many small[s] as to have
no magnitude, so many large[s] as to be infinite. On the interpretation discussed up to
now the first part of the assertion is plainly neglected. The idea of many commentators
is in all likelihood that from the quote cited by Simplicius at the beginning of the same
fragment [if what is had no magnitude, it would not exist at all], it can be inferred that
one can simply dismiss this possibility. A more subtle view of the matter credits Zeno
with the contemplation of things being but without magnitude, like unextended math-
ematical points.21 The reasoning supposedly goes as follows: Zeno says that a) infinite
division leads to an infinite number of final, indivisible parts which still do have a mag-
itude, because, b) if they would not have magnitude, they would not be at all, and so
the object of which they are part would not be at all. And an infinite number of parts
possessing, however small, finite magnitude, would give us an object infinitely big.
But c) given that the division is complete (‘throughout’), no parts with finite magnitude
can remain22, therefore d) the object constituted by them will be infinitely small. Thus,
upon Zeno’s argument, a finite thing consisting of a plurality would be either infinitely
large or infinitely small. The subtle variant of the standard interpretation thus offers
us Zeno’s argument as a dilemma. Owen develops the dilemma explicitly in terms of
divisibility.23 This is also what Huggett does, by deriving as horns from the proposition
19VLAS, p. 234.
20The Greek is πα′ ντη
ι
[pante¯i]: overall, everywhere, carries the idea of an undiscriminated application.
21The French author P. Tannery introduced in the modern literature the idea that set theory and the para-
doxes appearing in it should be related to the work of Zeno. P. Tannery, “Le concept scientifique du continu.
Ze´non d’Ele´e et Georg Cantor”, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’e´tranger, 20, 1885, p. 397 sq.
22An assumption which is made explicit is the “Porphyry text”: if any part of it is left over, it has not yet
been divided throughout [pante¯i]. VLAS, p. 229.
23G.E.L. Owen, op. cit..
ZENO’S PARADOXES. A CARDINAL PROBLEM 7
The points have either zero length or finite length the conclusions C1. The total length
of the segment is zero versus C2. The total length of the segment is infinite.24 This
viewpoint necessitates anyhow another interpretation of his infinite division, namely
that every resulting part will be subject to the infinite series of stepwise divisions. One
then obtains a countably infinite number of decreasing sequences, resulting in a count-
ably infinite number of dimensionless endpoints. This reading of the argument has a
venerable tradition and it respects the historical order of things, since this is the way
the atomists interpreted it.25 Alas, Zeno nowhere presupposes material atoms. This pro-
cess is taken to be carried through somehow up to the moment the unextended points
composing the (rational part of) real line are reached, the “infinitieth” element of every
sequence. It is eventually concluded that Zeno commits a fatal, yet this time logical,
fallacy. Indeed, on the assumption — necessary if the enquiry into the consequences of
the concept ‘plurality’ is to be exhaustive — that such an ordinal [i.e., stepwise] infinite
process could be completed, an absurdity results. It is called by Gru¨nbaum (following
Weyl) “Bernoulli’s fallacy”: He [Bernoulli] treated the actually infinite set of natural
numbers as having a last or “∞th” term which can be “reached” in the manner in
which an inductive cardinal can be reached by starting from zero.26 The error imposed
on Zeno has therefore two wings that match the horns of the presumed dilemma; one
concerning ‘infinitely small’ and one concerning ‘infinitely large’.27 The logical explic-
itation of the first wing has been summarised nicely by Vlastos: Since “infinitely” =
“endlesly” and “completion” = “ending”, it follows that “the completion of the infinite
division of x is logically possible” = “the ending of the endless division of x is logi-
cally possible.” Its mathematical variant is the Bernoullian fallacy inhaerent, according
to Gru¨nbaum, in e.g. Lee’s and Tannery’s construal of Zeno’s plurality-argument: it is
always committed when the attempt is made to use infinite divisibility of positive [i.e.,
finite] intervals as a basis for deducing Zeno’s metrical paradox and for then denying
that a positive interval can be an infinitely divisible extension.28 Of course it is true that
an infinite number of physically extended things lumped together would be infinitely
big! It is not even necessary to suppose that they be equal, as Huggett29 does. For ev-
idently I can build unequal parts out of equal ones, as long as they stand in rational
proportions to each other, which is exactly what the decreasing sequence of cuts of the
received view brings about. So whether one construes Zeno’s procedure as a directed
division or as one potentially throughout (as described above) will not even make a
difference. Once the sequence of partitions is interrupted somewhere — remember the
meaning of a-peiron — and thus remains incompleted even after an infinite number of
steps, it will generate an infinity of parts with finite magnitude (unequal in the case of
directed division, equal in case the division was ‘throughout’). But Zeno denies exactly
this possibility of getting a countably infinite number of extended parts from a finitely
24N. Huggett, o.c., pp. 44-45.
25Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus, 56-57. M. Conche, Epicure, Lettres et Maximes, PUF, Paris,
1987/1999, pp. 108-111. See also the commentary on pp. 147-151.
26A. Gru¨nbaum, o.c., pp. 130-131.
27Compare the sections “The Deduction of Nullity of Size” and “The Deduction of Infinity of Size” in
Vlastos’s discussion of the problem, VLAS, “Plurality”, p. 227 sq. and p. 233 sq.
28A. Gru¨nbaum, o.c., pp. 131-132.
29N. Huggett, o.c., section 2.2.
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extended thing: if they are many [things], they by necessity are as many as they are, not
more nor less. But if they are as many as they are, they will be bounded [DK 29B 3]. In
the interrupted case, the number will be ‘bounded’, i.e., finite, and the magnitude will
be so too! Abraham calls this Zeno’s principle of the equivalence of the parts and
the whole, and as far as I can see it is the only way to understand it commensurable
with the content of the other fragments.30 A valid interpretation of ‘directed division’
with respect to this is hardly conceivable. Finally, following Abraham’s linguistic argu-
mentation31, this construal of Zeno’s procedure can definitively be ruled out, because
it is perfectly possible to translate the substantivated participle in the mentioned clause
in [DK 29B 1] as “any projecting [part]”, since ancient Greek does not discriminate be-
tween a definite and an indefinite particle.32 When one has no content-loaden a priori
in mind, ‘any’ evidently fits in: it would simply mean any of the symmetric parts ob-
tained by a dichotomic division, irrespective of the level the procedure attained. This
is confirmed by the use of the verb α’πǫ′ χǫιν in the previous line, which conveys the
idea ‘to be kept away from each other, to be separated actively’ — and therefore to
remain in contact, to be contiguous, like when one pushes his way through a crowd —
rather than merely ‘to be at a distance’. This is why Vlastos in his paraphrase of Zeno’s
arguments speaks of “nonoverlapping parts”.33 The nice and certainly not arbitrary an-
tisymmetrical description of the totality of the procedure when one takes [DK 29B 1]: for
none will be the last [eschaton] nor the one [heteron] will be unrelated to another one
[pros heteron], and contrasts it with [DK 29B 3]: For there will always [aei] be others
[hetera] in between [metaxu] of the beings, and there again others in between, is a case
in point. The second wing also comes in two variants, though the difference is between
mathematics and physics, rather than between logic and mathematics. The mathemati-
cal one is the familiar objection that the sum of an infinite series can be finite, in case
the series converges. The other variant goes back to Aristotle [e.g. Phys. 263a(4-6)] and
points in one way or another out that the execution of an infinity of discrete physical
acts within a finite stretch of time must be impossible. This objection is at the origin
of the recent discussion on “supertasks”.34 These discussions can be relevant with re-
gard to Zeno, but only when one gives heed to certain precautions. I however want to
contest the standard interpretation, and therewith reject the claim that Zeno committed
any such fallacy. It is important to stress here once again the physical nature of Zeno’s
thought-experiment and the deictic realism inhaerent in it. It is as well important not to
introduce any presuppositions on behalf of Zeno, especially not those that only came
into existence in an attempt to deal with problems raised by him. To this latter kind
belong all mathematical and physical assumptions concerning the ‘continuous’ vs. the
‘discrete’ nature of matter, space and time. Zeno nowhere mentions space nor time
30W.E. Abraham, “Plurality”, pp. 40-52. Contrary to KRS, who construe the second part of [DK 29B 3] as
an objection to the first.
31Not to mention the fact that the direction imposed upon the procedure in all likelihood is merely an
artefact of our direction of reading! W.E. Abraham, “Plurality”, p. 42.
32I agree with Abraham that the parallel with παa ς o‘ βoυλo′ µǫνoς is relevant. Of the individualising
vs. the generalising — “to make a certain person or thing into the representative of the whole species” —
function of the article, very explicit examples can be given. The translated quote stems from P.V. Sormani
and H.M. Braaksma, Kaegi’s Griekse Grammatica, Noordhoff, Groningen, 1949, pp. 112-113.
33VLAS, p. 225.
34For an overview: J. P. Laraudogoitia,“Supertasks”, STF, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/
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simply because these notions do not yet exist! Therefore he cannot set up a dilemma
on these praemisses. But then couldn’t one construct the dilemma on the basis of an
utterance present in the Zenonian text? There is no philological source-material upon
which it can be based. Worse, of the necessarily disjunctive structure underlying such
an argument there is no trace. The contradiction that should arise out of it is laid out
already in the supposed praemisses, for Zeno uses towards the end of [DK 29B 1] twice
the word και8 [and] instead of the required η’′ ; η’′τoι [or], thus complying once again
to Simplicius’s dictum that he intended nothing else but to show that a man who says
that there is a plurality is stating something contradictory.
Now, in order to throw more light on the nature of the problem at hand, it is cru-
cial to realise that there is a difference between the joining of two physical parts and
the addition of two mathematical line segments. The difference touches upon the far
from trivial problem of the relation between the mathematical and the natural sciences.
In Plato’s Phaedo there is an extremely illuminating discussion of this relationship,
with reference to the “contradictory” results generated by the natural philosophy gone
before. Socrates complains that, since it allows for akin things to have contradictory
causes, while phaenomena clearly distinct become causally undistinguishable, its re-
sults cannot be considered valid [Phaedo, 100(e)-101(a,b)].35 He gives the example of
the difference between “being two things” and “being a pair of things”; the latter a
formal, the former a physical fact. He also focuses on the relation between parts and
wholes in number theory, by comparing the generation of ‘two’ out of ‘two ones’ by
by adding them, bringing them together, and the separation of ‘two’ into ‘two ones’
by dividing it [Phaedo, 97(a,e)]. The Zenonian influence is plain, although scarcely
discussed in the literature. There is an even more striking parallel with Plato’s diairesis
– the dissection of a concept into its constituting contraries, the technique shoring up
properly practiced dialectics, as applied in the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Phile-
bus.36 We will return in more detail to the Philebus, where the link between conceptual
and mathematical diairesis is established, when discussing our proposal for a faithful
mathematical representation of Zeno’s divisional procedure. As is well known. Plato in
the Sophist defines ‘dialectics’ as the art of making the proper distinctions between the
forms that instantiate themselves in and through particular things [Sophist, 253d(1-3)].
In that dialogue, moreover, the difference established between contraries and contra-
dictions — between praedicative and existential paradoxes — lays out its ontological
preconditions.37 Now, harking back to something used already in the Parmenides, viz.
the dichotomic way of reasoning, the method by which diairesis should be applied is
demonstrated in the Philebus and the Statesman by means of examples. In the latter di-
alogue, while trying to define the good statesman, Socrates and his friends find out that
the most long and cumbersome, but nevertheless the best way [Statesman, 265(a)] to
discover the specific forms instantiated in a thing is by systematically dividing its con-
cept in opposing halves, like ‘living/non-living’ [id., 261(b)], ‘feathered/unfeathered’
35All references to this dialogue are to the text in the LOEB3-edition.
36The texts I consulted are those in LOEB4.
37Platonists who doubt that they are spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge that they are inves-
tigators of the verb ‘to be’. G.E.L. Owen, “Plato on Non-being”, Plato: a Collection of Critical Essays, vol.
i, G. Vlastos ed., Anchor/Doubleday, N.Y., 1971, p. 223.
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[id., 266(e)] or ‘odd/even’, instead of arbitrarily separating off a part — ‘Greeks’ vs.
‘barbarians’; ‘ten’ vs. ‘all other numbers’ [id., 262(d-e)], say. This process ends when
one bumps on undetermined parts, the stoicheia or elements, that are not themselves
capable of being specified further into underlying parts [id., 263(b)]. There are — in the
vocabulary of later times — no differentia specifica involved anymore, their plurality, if
any, is merely numerical. The number of steps needed to reach from the original unity
to this fully determined level — the proportion between part and whole — then defines
somehow the original concept [Philebus, 16(d)]. This, however, is often not possible,
especially not when the praedicates are relative properties like ‘warm/cold’; ‘short/tall’
&c. Their opposites will run apart into their proper infinities and thus into conceptual
absurdity unless a limit, a boundary [peras] is imposed on them, in order to find the
good measure that guarantees their non-destructive, bounded aequilibrium from the
reality of the thing they describe sprang [Statesman, 283(d,e)]. Aristotle states it in
words that could not be more clear: Plato, for his part, recognises two infinities, the
Large and the Small τo8 µǫ′ γα και8 τo8 µικρo′ ν [to mega kai to mikron] [Phys. 203a
15]. They can be discriminated indubitably, for with each goes a different mode of re-
alisation: everything is infinite, either through addition [i.e. stepwise], either through
division [i.e. simultaneously] (...) [Phys. 204a 6].38
Aristotle himself discusses the problem directly in relation to Zeno, and puts it in
a way that clears the road for his notorious solution: the introduction of the difference
between potential and actual infinity: For in two ways it can be said that a distance
or a period or any other continuum is infinite [apeiron], viz., with respect to the par-
titions [diairesin] or with respect to the projecting parts [tois eschatois] [Phys. Z, 2,
263a (24-26)]. The vast majority of authors admits that Aristotle did indeed attempt
to solve PM (though not PP!) that way, although his solution is generally dismissed
as false or no longer mathematically relevant: We won’t pursue this position, for the
actual/potential distinction is not applicable to modern mathematics.39 This is hardly
acceptable a priori when one realises that it throws us back to a problem already posed
in Plato’s Phaedo: what does it mean to divide a continuous one into two parts? Aris-
totle comments: For whoever divides the continuum into two halves thereby confers a
double function on the point of division, for he makes it both a beginning and an end
[Phys. Θ 8, 263a (23-25)].40 And the points of partition serve as boundaries to the
parts, be they potential or actual in number, i.e., discernable and countable or not.41
Zeno’s Gedanken-experiment, by investigating the ultimate consequences of the infi-
nite divisibility of a physical being, hits on the said difference between the physical and
the mathematical and thus creates the preconditions necessary to establish its various
later forms. Poincare´ discussed this crucial difference in a way that will prove of great
38See J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt Bei Platon und Aristotles, Teubner, Leipzig, 1933, p. 30 sq.; p. 60 sq.
39N. Huggett, o.c., p. 40.
40translations are after Wicksteed and Cornford in LOEB2.
41This relationship is exposed admirably clear by Mary Tyles, The Philosophy of Set Theory. An Histor-
ical Introduction into Cantor’s Paradise, Dover, N.Y. 2004 [1th ed. 1989], especially pp. 10-31. The book
discusses the foundations of set theory with the clash between finitists and non-finitists on the foundations of
mathematics as its vantage point. Interestingly enough it has a logical counterpart as well. C. Vidal showed
in his Maˆitrise de philosophie: “Georg Cantor et la de´couverte des infinis”, Paris I-Sorbonne, 2002-2003, p.
40, that a far from innocent inversion of logical quantifiers is involved.
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relevance to the mathematical representation we are going to build in the remainder
of this paper.42 Tannery refers in this context to the critique of Protagoras on the ge-
ometers as quoted in Aristotle [Met. B, ii, 997b(33)-998a(5)] : (...) for as sensible lines
are not like those of which the geometrician speaks (since there is nothing sensible
which is straight or curved in that sense; the circle touches the ruler not at a [single]
point, as Protagoras used to say refuting the geometricians).43 So, again, we cannot
find salvation with logic, nor with space and time44, nor with the continuous and the
discrete, just with Zeno’s division throughout. The only other thing we can rely upon is
Parmenides’s Being-now. This analysis imposes two criteria that have to be fulfilled by
whatever formal representation of Zeno’s paradox: constructivity and simultaneity.
It indeed endorses a hitherto haedly recognised line of approach. It is Abraham who
(overlooking Parmenides, but reference to him only strengthens the reasoning) opens
up in a brilliant argumentation this possibility, which comes down to accepting fully
the consequences of the fact that Zeno’s division is a timeless division. To start with,
let us follow what he has to say:
The objection that Zeno assumes the completion of an infinite task assumes
that, when he postulates that the being is divided through and through
and so on infinitely, he is introducing end-products which logically cannot
be further divided, or he is assuming a least division beyond which there
is no other, and so, a last part. Now even though there is an actual infinite
number of points in a line at any of which points the line may be divided,
the finite line does have terminal points (. . .) But it would be a howler,
committed by Johan Bernoulli, and decried by Leibniz, that a terminal
point would be “the infinitieth point” on the line. (. . .) To say that it is
infinitely divided is no more than to say it actually has an infinite number
of points at every one of which it is divisible. The point to note is that the
infinite divisibility means not an infinite number of points of alternative45
division (such that the alternatives are inexhaustible) but rather an infinite
number of points of simultaneous division. The points of division, being
points on the being, belong to it not alternatively, but simultaneously. It is
this simultaneity (and not a process) which is articulated by the postulate
of the complete division. It is clear that if Zeno’s complete division thus is
a cardinal completion rather than an ordinal completion, the infinite divi-
sion of the given being does not imply a last division or last part, any more
42H. Poincare´, “Le continu mathe´matique”, Reveu de me´taphysique et de morale, 1, 1893, pp. 26-34. A
reprint entitled “La grandeur mathe´matique et l’expe´rience” in SHYP, pp. 47-60. He deepens his ideas in “La
notion d’espace”, reprinted in SVAL, pp. 55-76.
43In a rare display of negligence, DK destroy exactly the point of the argument by translating κανo′ νoς by
Tangente instead of ruler! And although Tannery places this discussion explicitly “dans le cadre de Ze´non”,
he concludes: (...) la question est donc d’un autre ordre que celles souleve´es par Ze´non, et sa dialectique
e´tait impuissante a` la re´soudre (...), the reason being that also he takes Zeno’s argument as constituting the
dilemma exposed above. It will be clear that I do not approve of either position: when understood properly,
Zeno does not have this problem at all. See [DK 80B 7], transl. in vol. II, p. 266; P. Tannery, o.c., pp. 396-397.
I used the translation given by H. Tredennick, LOEB1, Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 115. The [ ] are mine.
44As KRS, p. 273, point out with regard to the Arrow Paradox.
45i.e., stepwise. The italics are in the original. The bold further down the quotation is mine.
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than the simultaneity of the points on a line imply an infinitieth point.46
The central point thus is that by being simultaneous (i.e., by occuring in no lapse of
time) the completion by division is at once, cardinal, not stepwise, ordinal. This refers
to the aritmetic of “infinity”, developed towards the end of the nineteenth century by
G. Cantor, who proved that different kinds of infinity exist which he called cardinal
and ordinal infinity.47 Cardinality (“Zahl”) expresses the total number of elements of a
given set; ordinality (“Anzahl”) concerns the way these elements can be ordered step-
wise. He furthermore showed that the set of natural numers IN and the set of finite
fractions Q possess the same countably infinite cardinality, which he labelled Aleph-
null (ℵ0). The basic ordinality that goes with it he called ω. It is possible to construct
an infinite sequence of ω’s which comprise different ordinalities that all belong to the
same number class, i.e., discern levels of equal cardinality: ωi = Z(ℵ1); ω′i = Z(ℵ2),
&c. The difference only becomes relevant from the moment the numbers implied are
infinite. Consider for instance theset of natural numbers ordered in the traditional man-
ner {0, 1, 2, . . .} and ordered alternatively {1, 2, . . . , 0}. The cardinal number of these
sets will be equal; their ordinal numbers will be respectively ω and ω + 1. Cantor also
showed by means of his famous diagonalisation argument that 2IN, the cardinality of
the set of real numbers IR48 — the mathematical face of the idea of continuity —, is
an infinity bigger than the cardinality of IN or Q: they do not belong to the same num-
ber class.49 The infinity of the continuum is uncountable. Abraham’s intention with
respect to Zeno’s division now becomes more clear. He apparently claims that Zeno’s
procedure at once generates the uncountable cardinality of the continuum instead of the
merely countable one which would be attainable when one interpretes Zeno’s proce-
dure stepwise. This reminds us of the viewpoint also defended by authors like Tannery
and Luria, castigated by Gru¨nbaum for reasons given in the following comment: it is
essential to realize that the cardinality of an interval is not a function of the length
of that interval. The independence of cardinality and length becomes demonstrable by
combining our definition of length with Cantor’s proof of the equivalence of the set of
all real points between 0 and 1 with the set of all real points between any two fixed
points on the number axis.50 And it is exactly this error that Gru¨nbaum predicates on
Zeno’s plurality paradoxes: according to him, Zeno maintains that a longer part “con-
tains more points”. This is nothing but another variant of the ‘Bernoullian fallacy”
which he believes also to be present in the paradoxes of motion. Now it is precisely
Abraham’s aim to show that this error is not present in Zeno’s plurality-argument, for
it would imply a divisional process through time, and Zeno nowhere mentions ‘time’.
But this does not yet suffice to completely solve the riddle, because it leaves untouched
a related problem raised by Gru¨nbaum: how to construct an extended object out of parts
with no extension whatsoever? Zeno cannot just intend that his division generates the
unextended points composing the continuous line, for then only the ‘being nothing’-
part of his paradox would remain. Zeno’s divisional procedure generates an infinity of
46W.E. Abraham, “Plurality”, p. 48. My bold.
47G. Cantor, “Beitra¨ge zur Begru¨ndung der transfiniten Mengenlehre”, Gesammelte Abhandlungen [GA
in what follows], E. Zermelo Ed., Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1932/1962, pp. 312-356.
48F. Hausdorff, Mengenlehre, Chelsea Publishing Company, N.Y., 1949, pp. 62-64.
49G. Cantor, “ ¨Uber eine elemetare Frage der Mannigfaltigkeitslehre”, GA, pp. 279-281.
50A. Gru¨nbaum, o.c., p. 127.
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partitions and a different infinity of parts at once and jointly in any part independent
of its length. The simultaneous and uninterrupted [apeiron] repetition of partitions is
clearly stated by Zeno himself: to say this once is as good as saying it forever [aei].
The result is an infinity of parts which must at least be dense: for none will be the last
nor one will be apart from another one and For there will always be others in between
of the beings, and there again others in between. We know moreover that it results
in parts with and without magnitude, whence we may safely assume that this strange
fact is somehow connected to the presence of different infinities: we do not only have
density but also arbitrary length! It is tempting to conclude that Zeno’s way of putting
his problem betrays an intuitive awareness of the notion of infinite cardinality, which
moreover would render Aristotle’s bewildering step to discriminate between two in-
finities, potential and actual, not only comprehensible, but places it in a glaring light.
This is confirmed by Aristotle’s own interpretation: For in two ways it can be said that
a distance or a period or any other continuum is infinite [apeiron], viz., with respect
to the partitions [diairesin] or with respect to the projecting parts [tois eschatois], al-
though Aristotle in all likelihood would deny that Zeno himself realised this. But a
drawback of our interpretation up to now is that it does not fit into the received view
on the paradoxes of motion, of which some are incontestably based on dichotomy as
well, as again the Stagirite diagnoses: This argument [the Achilles] is the same as the
former which depends on dichotomia [Phys. Z, 9, 239b (20-21)]. The received view
on Zenonian plurality on the contrary does, at least partially, comply to this criterion.
I can circumvent this objection only by devising an interpretation that gives us PM as
the result of a division through and through. This is precisely the nature of my claim
with respect to them, as I hope to convincingly argue towards the end of this article.
A SIMPLE MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION.— In accordance with Zeno’s al-
ready mentioned realism towards everyday phaenomena like plurality and change, we
shall develop a mathematical representation of Zeno’s divisional procedure Z that is as
simple as possible, that does not make any presupposition other than those explicitly
retracable to our philosopher, and is applicable to all his paradoxes alike. So, then, what
do we know about Zeno’s division?
i) it goes on “infinitely”;
ii) it is symmetrical (proportion 1:2);
iii) it results somehow in parts with and without magnitude;
iv) it is a simultaneous procedure;
v) it pops up in all his paradoxes.
What we need is a procedure whereby “two different kinds of infinity are generated
simultaneously”, and in which “the points of division are used twice”. Let us take as a
model object a measuring rod M , of which we conventionally call the left-hand side 0
and the right-hand side 1, and which we arbitrarily set equal to unity.51 This we can do,
given that the specific length of the object by no means influences the argument. What
will happen when we Zenonian-wise divide this model-object through and through?
We can see this division as a kind of cell division, whereby in each generation the
51I owe this illustrative example to an electronic discussion with J. Helfand.
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number of parts generated doubles: when generation n has 2n parts, generation n+ 1
will have 2n+1 parts. And we know that n → ∞. This can be represented graphically
by a divisional tree. The cells function at every step in two different ways: as partitions
in generation n − 1 and as parts in generation n. In every generation, generation by
addition and generation by division thus coincide. The number of partitions should at
least reach n ≤ ω, with ω the basic ordertype of IN:
0 1
The measuring rod M and the tree of cell-divisions.
The simultaneous division-lattice stands for the totality of Z, and thence equally bears
a twofold interpretation: by looking at the “last row” at generation ω and dividing once
more, or by mapping the whole procedure on the IN-lattice by relating the number
of partitions to number of cells, and the number of parts to the number of paths be-
tween them. The first procedure comes intuitively closer to what Zeno intended, but
inevitably introduces an inappropriate notion of time, a flaw which is absent from the
second one. Anyhow, the result in both cases is the same: the number of partitions |IN|
with its concommittant number of parts |IR|= 2IN are generated simultaneously and
with a clearly different status. So I am not saying that the result of Zeno’s procedure
is merely a set with the cardinality of the continuum, like the Euclidean straight line.
That would, moreover, be nothing new, as I indicated when discussing Tannery’s and
Abraham’s views. It nevertheless is already remarkable enough that such a construction
of the continuum should be possible at all. Attempts to do something akin to it have
been proposed in the context of constructive or intuitionistic mathematics.52 In order to
make the difference with our own procedure completely clear, we will devote ourselves
now to a short and non-rigorous discussion of the approach on the basis of Brouwer’s
dissertation and Troelstra’s fundamental work.53 Briefly stated, intuitionistic mathe-
matics was conceived by L.E.J. Brouwer in a reaction to the discovery of the logical
52My attention was drawn to intuitionistic mathematics by the discussion in M. Tiles’s book, o.c., p. 90-94.
53A.S. Troelstra, Principles of Intuitionism, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 1969, p. 22, 52; pp. 57-64.
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and set theoretic paradoxes at the beginning of the twentieth century. The basic philo-
sophical ideas shoring up his de´marche are 1) mathematics precedes logic, not the other
way around; and 2) classical logic fails in universally applying the principle of the ex-
cluded middle (TND), which states that all logically valid propositions have either the
values “true” or “false” attached to them. Both principles are intimately connected to
Brouwer’s attitude towards the mathematical infinite. To talk about “all” or “for every”
when the number of objects considered is infinite amounts into absurdity according to
him. He holds that in mathematics the infinite can only be potential, i.e., so as to be
stepwise approached but never reached, while the actual infinite of the standard view
of the continuum cannot have real existence. In his Proefschrift [dissertation], Brouwer
writes: Het continuum als geheel was ons echter intuı¨tief gegeven; een opbouw er-
van, een handeling die “alle” punten ervan geı¨ndividualiseerd door de mathematische
intuı¨tie zou scheppen, is ondenkbaar en onmogelijk. De mathematische intuı¨tie is niet
in staat anders dan aftelbare hoeveelheden geı¨ndividualiseerd te scheppen, n.l. zo´, dat
men een proce´de´ geeft, dat elk element der verzameling na een eindig aantal oper-
aties genereert.54 The question then becomes how much standard mathematics we can
get back on such a constrained conceptual basis. Brouwer himself advanced the idea
that the continuum could be constructed by means of finite sequences — a countable
number of “duaalbreuken, ternaalbreuken” [dual, ternal fractions, i.e., rationals written
in binary or ternary form] — which approach points P , the “dubbelpunten” [double
points]55 demarcated by neighbourhoods which remain outside the “schaal” [scale] de-
termined by the “voortschrijdingswet” [Law of Progression] of the sequence.56 It is as
if one covers the given continuum with another one full of tiny holes [“lacunes”] which
one can then “samendenken” [think together] by the process of approximation.57 This
process can be represented by a “boom” [tree]58, to the decreasing parts of which one
can associate a binary representation.59 Troelstra formalises these ideas; the basic no-
tions required are a species, a sequence and a tree or spread. Species are the intuitionis-
tic analog for classical sets. They comply to a specific form of the axiom of comprehen-
sion, predicated on a precise interpretation of the concept of well-definedness based on
the idea of provability. (Again, we shall not forget that intuinionism originated in the
wake of the discovery of the famous set theoretic paradoxes.) Now let a sequence be
a mapping, i.e. a process which associates with every natural number a mathematical
54The continuum as a whole was given to us intuitively however; to construct it by means of an act of
mathematical intuition that would create “all” of its points individually, is unthinkable and impossible.
Mathematical intuition can only create countable quantities individually, i.e., such, that a procedure is given
which generates every element of the collection after a finite number of operations. L.E.J. Brouwer, “Over
de grondslagen der wiskunde. Academisch Proefschrift [1907]”, in D. Van Dalen, L.E.J. Brouwer en de
grondslagen der wiskunde, Epsilon, Utrecht, 2001, p. 73. [My translation.]
55L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., pp. 56.
56L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., pp. 43-45.
57Zo kan een gegeven continuu¨m door een ander continuu¨m met lacunes worden overdekt [covered]; we
behoeven daartoe op het eerste continuu¨m maar een ordetype η te bouwen, dat het niet overal dicht [dense]
bedekt en vervolgens bij dat ordetype η het continuu¨m te construeren; we kunnen dan altijd een punt van
het tweede continuu¨m identiek noemen met het grenspunt van zijn benaderingsreeks [the limit-point of its
approaching sequence] op het eerste continuu¨m. L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., p. 73. The “ordertype η” belongs to
Cantor’s first number class, as Brouwer makes clear on pp. 42-43 [cfr. ft. 72 infra].
58L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., pp. 73-76.
59H. Weyl, Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Mu¨nchen, 1926, p. 43; p. 51.
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object belonging to a certain species X : (IN)X : IN −→ X .60 These sequences are
introduced in order to develop an intuitionistic theory of real numbers. Given a map
ξ, the species X can be represented by a spread with an aequivalence relation ∼ if
<a, ξ > is a spread, and if X∗, the species of aequivalence classes with respect to ∼
can be mapped bi-uniquely (injectively) onto X . So X can be represented by <a, ξ>
via its partition X∗. The spread represents a set of nodes of a growing “tree” of finite
sequences of natural numbers, with branches directed downwards; the topmost node
corresponds always with the empty sequence.61 The tree may be branched up to an arbi-
trarily high level. It will be clear that this construction does not fulfill the criteria which
emerged out of our analysis of Zeno’s procedureZ. For, as Troelstra himself unambigu-
ously states, his procedure implies a process consisting of a finite though unspecified
number of steps. And in a related context, Brouwer himself says that he sees the se-
quence of divisions generated by it as taking place door den tijd [through time]. The
open-endedness of the procedure is of course a necessity if one wants to approximate
the real numbers by means of it.62 But how then to avoid the Bernoullian fallacy? By re-
habilitating the Aristotelian notion of the potentially infinite, the idea of an infinite pro-
cess that theoretically could, but in reality never will, be concluded. The totality of all
potentially infinite sequences of rationals (...) is a potentially infinite whole containing
members which are never fully determinate, for they themselves are potentially infinite,
and always actually finite but necessarily incomplete. As a matter of fact, since the
process of focusing is not, and can never be complete, the continuum is never resolved
into points, only into ever smaller regions.63 Hermann Weyl, who stresses exactly this
aspect of Brouwer’s approach, links it to Plato: Brouwer erblickt genau wie Plato in
der Zwei-Einigkeit die Wurzel des mathematischen Denkens. Plato’s α’ o′ ριστoς δυα′ ς
[indeterminate twoness] is the principle of generation underlying diairesis [conceptual
division] by means of which both the Large and the Small come about. As Aristotle
explains in Book N of the Metaphysics, it is closely related to Platonic number the-
ory.64 We will see later that Weyl’s account in fact only reckons the ‘Large’-part of
Platonic diairesis. It is outside our scope to dwell on this more elaborately here, but
the parallel with Zeno’s analysis will nevertheless be clear: Plato’s Large-and-Small
τo
8
µǫ
′
γα και
8
τo
8
µικρo
′
ν 65 and Zeno’s large[s]-and-small[s] µǫ′ γαλα και8 µικρα8
both refer to the paradoxical result of an infinite and through and through division.66
Plato’s metaphysical preoccupation with non-paradoxical plurality however forces him
60A. Troelstra, o.c., p. 16.
61A. Troelstra, o.c., p. 52.
62H. Weyl, o.c., p. 44.
63M. Tiles, o.c., pp. 91-92.
64This fact is in itself quite undeniable and its recognition does not imply a position in the controversy
surrounding the “Tu¨binger Schule” interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. Traces of Platonic diairesis can be
found back in the earliest dialogues, and arguably contributed to the development of Plato’s theory of Forms,
at least according to M.K. Krizan, “A Defense of Diairesis in Plato’s Gorgias, 463e5-466a3”, Philosophical
Inquiry, XII(1-2), 1-21. For a recent and moderate overview of the issues at stake, see D. Pesce, Il Platone
di Tubinga, E due studi sullo Stoicismo, Paideia, Brescia, 1990.
65Cited by Aristotle in e.g. [Met. A, 987b(20)]. Cfr. J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt Bei Platon und Aristotles,
Teubner, Leipzig, 1933 (2nd ed.), p. 6.
66Although I found it nowhere discussed from this perspective in the literature. The singular in Plato’s
expression stems from the fact that he applies the paradoxical property to the abstract principle by which
division is obtained, while with Zeno the plural directly refers to its result.
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to enlarge the ‘here’-part of Zeno’s deictic standpoint into an in principle unlimited
number of partial perspectives that cover the totality of the divisional tree. Thanks to
an idea of M. Serfati, it will be possible to formally distinguish the set of perspectives
(l’ensemble des points de vue) from the tree itself.67 For the human mind, however,
the relocation of the infinite to the realm of the Ideas makes that the part of the tree
accessible to it always remains partial, while with Zeno the totality of the divisional
process is given in the here-and-now. But again with Plato, being ideal does not mean
being unreal, quite the contrary! That is why the Platonic spectator of Being in its
One/Many-marked appearance retains a definitely paradoxical flavour.
SOME PRELIMINARY NOTIONS.– In order to fully establish Z we need, I repeat, a
procedure whereby “two different kinds of infinity are generated simultaneously”, and
in which “the points of division are used twice”. The two kinds of infinity are simul-
taneously there and have a different status: as partitions and as parts. Because of the
constructive simultaneity, they do not only come both about at once, but pop up as well
without anything else intervening between them. This latter point gives us a clue as to
where to look for a viable mathematical approach, for in set theory a very important
hypothetical theorem deals exactly with this type of situation. This is Cantor’s con-
tinuum hypothesis. But before we can appropiately make use of it ourselves, we first
have to turn our attention to the question that underlies it. Let us briefly review its math-
ematical and conceptual content. We saw that Zeno’s plurality paradox can be seen as
a divisional procedure for constructing the continuum as instantiated in a finitely ex-
tended body representable as a part of the real line. It would be nice to know how much
‘parts’ are exactly needed to build it up. This is precisely the zest of Cantor’s contin-
uum problem: How many points are there on a straight line in Euclidean space?68 We
already saw that multiple infinite cardinalities exist. They are represented by indexed
Hebrew characters called alephs (ℵi). The continuum hypothesis is the question: what
is the cardinality ℵc (or c, in a to-day more common notation) of the continuum? Let
us take a look at it more closely. Cantor defined the magnitude of a set by means of
its cardinality. Two sets are aequivalent, that is, a bijective relationship between their
elements exists, when their cardinalities are equal.69 But there is an other number that
expresses a basic characteristic of a set, its ordinality. Cardinality expresses the si-
multaneous totality, the number of elements present of a given set; ordinality concerns
the order by way of which these elements are generated stepwise. “Ma¨chtigkeit” oder
“Kardinalzahl” nennen wir den Allgemeinbegriff, welcher mit Hilfe unseres aktiven
Denkvermogens dadurch aus der Menge M hervorgeht, daß von der Beschaffenheit
ihrer verschiedenen Elemente m und von der Ordnung ihres Gegebenseins abstrahiert
wird.70 In the finite case there is no problem: a basket containing eight apples is a set
67M. Serfati, “Quasi-ensembles d’ordre r et approximations de re´partitions ordonne´es”, Math. Inf. Sci.
hum., 143, 1998, pp. 5-26.
68K. Go¨del, “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?”, BPPM, p. 470.
69unter eine “Belegung von N mit M” verstehen wir ein Gesetz, durch welches mit jedem Elemente n
von N je ein bestimmtes Element von M verbunden ist (. . .) Das mit n verbundene Element von M ist
gewissermaßen eine eindeutige Funktion von n und kann etwa mit f(n) bezeichnet werden (. . .); G. Cantor,
“Beitra¨ge zur Begru¨ndung der transfiniten Mengenlehre”, GA, p. 287.
70G. Cantor, “Beitra¨ge”, GA, p. 282.
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with cardinality eight, its ordinality being eight as well, given that we count the apples
one by one. We can add one apple; now we have nine. We can get to any arbitrarily big
natural number this way. This is how Cantor constructs potential infinity. He further-
more showed that the set of natural numers IN and the set of finite fractions Q possess
the same countably infinite cardinality, which means that, although their elements can
be enumerated, they can never be exhausted by means of enumeration. He labelled it
Aleph-null (ℵ0). Thus the set of natural numbers IN and the set of finite fractions Q
are aequivalent. The basic ordinality that goes with it he called ω. It is possible to con-
struct an infinite sequence of different ordinal numbers ωi that all belong to that same
number class of cardinality ℵ0. The difference between ordinals becomes relevant from
the moment the numbers so defined are infinite. Consider for instance the set of nat-
ural numers ordered in the traditional manner {0, 1, 2, . . .} and ordered alternatively
{1, 2, . . . , 0}. The cardinal number of these sets will be equal; their ordinal numbers
will be respectively ω and ω+1. The set {2, 4, 6, . . . ; 1, 3, 5, . . .} (even and odd num-
bers) has ordinality 2ω. The number of possible rearrangements is clearly unlimited.
Nevertheless, they all belong to the number class of ℵ0. Now it is possible to build an
infinite sequence of ordinalities by application of two different “Erzeugungsprinzipien”
or Principles of Generation71:
• First Principle of Generation: Addition of a unit to the previously formed number;
• Second Principle of Generation: Definition of the limit of every infinite sequence
of numbers as the nearest limit value [supremum] outside of it.
Thus a new number is created justly outside the infinite sequence of already existing or-
dinalities with cardinality ℵ0, which represents an infinity necessarily greater than ℵ0.
Cantor calls this new, bigger infinite cardinality naturally enough ℵ1. The first infinite
cardinality ℵ0 defines the second number class Z(ℵ1).72 The new basic ordinality can
now be used to construct a new sequence of ordinalities, all belonging to Z(ℵ2), the
thirth number class. A sequence of ever greater alephs can be built by systematically
applying the two principles of generation so that no upper bound can be assigned to
it; with each aleph a new, bigger cardinality aequivalent to the smallest ordinality of
its respective number class: ωi = Z(ℵi+1); ωi+1 = Z(ℵi+2), &c. Cantor proves by
means of an argument known as diagonalisation that indeed ℵ0 < ℵ1. Another way
to prove it is Cantor’s powerset Theorem: E ≺ P(E).73 From his powerset theorem
Cantor infers the general theorem that for each and every cardinal number, as well as
set of cardinal numbers, an immediate successor exists: ℵn < ℵn+1, with n ∈ N ).74
It will be clear that one thus not only obtains ascending sequences of ordinal, but also
of cardinal numbers ℵ0, ℵ1, ℵ2 . . .!75 The sequence of all possible ordinals Cantor
71G. Cantor, “Beitra¨ge”’, GA, pp. 312-356. Accessible treatments can be found in R. Rucker, Infinity and
the Mind. The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982 [1995], p.
65 sq, p. 223; and M. Tyles, o.c., pp. 104-107, of whom I borrow the English terminology.
72The first number class Z(ℵ0) comprises the finite ordinalities embodied by the set IN.
73F. Hausdorff, Mengenlehre, pp. 56-57; G.S. Boolos and R.C. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, CUP,
Cambridge, 1974/1989, p. 1 sq.
74F. Hausdorff, Mengenlehre, pp. 67-68.
75Cantor exposes his method in a succinct and clear way in a letter to Dedekind (1899). A translated
version in J. Heyenoort, From Frege to Go¨del, Harvard, 1967, pp. 113-117.
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called Ω; the sequence of all possible cardinals ℵ0, ℵ1, ℵ2 . . . he called i.76 These
objects are themselves not sets, for “thinking them as a whole” leads to paradoxes.77
Such collections, let us say to ‘big’ to be thought as a whole, Cantor termend incon-
sistent multiplicities. Every possible cardinal number will be represented somewhere
in the sequence i. In order to prove this latter point, one needs the often contested,
but critical, Axiom of Choice [AC].78 Intuitively, the AC allows that a simultaneous
choice of distinguished elements is in principle always possible for an arbitrary set of
sets.79 Zermelo, in his edition of Cantors collected work, castigates him for failing to
have realised this, thus committing a variant of the familiar Bernoullian fallacy: Only
through the use of the AC, which postulates the possibility of a simultaneous choice
(...)80 Although essential to its logical viability, this simultaneous character of AC is
often forgotten or dismissed, while Zermelo himself never gets tired of stressing its im-
portance. We now possess the instruments to reformulate our original question: which
one of the alephs in our sequence is equal to the number of points 2ℵ0 on the contin-
uous line? Where exactly in the totality of all possible cardinalities this number is to
be situated?81 Cantor demonstrated by means of diagonalisation that 2ℵ0 > ℵ0, and
advanced the hypothesis that it should be its immediate successor, ℵ1. This is Cantor’s
famous Continuum Hypothesis (CH)82:
2ℵ0 = ℵ1
Every infinite subset of the continuum has the power either of the set of integers, or of
the whole of the continuum, with no intermediate cardinalities intervening. As could
be expected, the hypothesis can again be generalised, so as to comprise all possible
cardinalities: the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis.83 We will notwithstanding limit
ourselves to CH, for the nature of our problem is demarcated by Zeno clearly to the
realm of the physical, even when encountered in its mathematical expression: the re-
ality of plurality and motion, as problematised in the clash between continuous and
76Idem, FTG, pp. 113-117.
77In the case of Ω the Burali-Forti paradox: if the set of ordinals is well ordered (i.e., every segment has
a least element), it has an ordinal, which is at the same time an element of this set and greater than any
of its elements. It is a variant of the more familiar Russell paradox. G. Cantor, “Letter to Dedekind”, in: J.
Van Heijenoort, From Frege to Go¨del [FTG in what follows], pp. 115-117. See also the paper by C. Burali-
Forti, id., pp. 104-112. This fact — diese omino¨se “Menge W” [E. Zermelo] — was the source of a vivid
controversy at the beginning of the last century. In addition to the papers present (in translation) in FTG,
one will profitably consult the volume composed by G. Heinzmann, Poincare´, Russell, Zermelo et Peano.
Textes de la discussion (1906-1912) sur les fondements des mathe´matiques: des antinomies a` la pre´dicativite´,
Blanchard, Paris, 1986, where a number of relevant but sometimes less well known papers are collected in
their original form. The Zermelo-quote stems from that source, p. 119. A relation to the axiom of choice is
exposed in M. Potter, Set Theory and its Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 243 sq.
78K. Go¨del, “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?”, BPPM, p. 471.
79E. Zermelo, “A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering”, FTG, p. 186.
80E. Zermelo in FTG, p. 117, ft. 3, to Cantor’ letter to Dedekind reprinted therein.
81Il faut distinguer entre l’hypothe`se du continu et le proble`me du continu (Kontinuumproblem), qui
consiste a` de´terminer la place occupe´e par le continu parmi les alephs, c.a`.d. a` de´terminer le nombre ordinal
α pour lequel 2ℵ0 = ℵα, explains W. Sierpin´ski, Hypothe`se du Continu, Z Subwencji Funduszu Kultury
Narodowej, Warsawa/Lwo´w, 1934 (reprinted in 1956 by the Chelsea Publishing Company), p. 5.
82K. Go¨del, “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?”, BPPM, p. 472.
83Maar: |2ℵ0| kan iets anders zijn dan ℵ1!
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discrete: the objects of transfinite set theory (...) clearly do not belong to the physi-
cal world and even their indirect connection with physical experience is very loose.84
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis is an important but contested mathematical statement
that brings together countable IN and uncountable 2IN infinities in a simultaneous way
and with no other cardinality intervening. It is contested because its validity is unde-
cidable within the framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatics (equipped with AC) for
set theory, as has been proven by Go¨del and Cohen. We do not presuppose ZF, how-
ever, and will speak about sets in an utterly naive way. We claim that, by generating the
large[s]-and-small[s], Zeno’s procedure Z really does the same as CH. We shall see in
what follows that in Zeno’s construction do indeed appear the cardinalities associated
with the naturals and the reals, and nothing else, so that in the world made up from the
elements of Zeno’s paradox — plurality, extension and change —, Cantor’s Continuum
Hypothesis is valid, or, put otherwise, that they are aequivalent:
Z ≡ ℵ0 6= 2
ℵ0 = ℵ1
OUTLINE OF THE PROOF.– It is natural to represent a Zenonian extended body
by a finite continuous line segment.85 We therefore conceive of Z as applied to such
an idealised measuring rod M , which we arbitrarily set equal to unity. Now M will
be dichotomised Zenonian-wise, i.e., at infinity, through and through, and simul-
taneously. We label the resulting left-hand parts 0, the right-hand parts 1 in every
subsequent generation. At each division a canonical choice is required that sends the
divisional sequence down along a specific path. We obtain a collection of nodes and
paths, each equipped with a unique binary representation.86 Thanks to the simultaneity,
the procedure and its result coincide, so that we can look at it constructively, without
being forced into an intuitionstic approach. In the IN-th generation, at the ω-divisional
level, the collection forms the set {0, 1}IN, that contains all possible partitions (nodes)
with their parts (connecting paths). It represents all possible orders on IN. The set thus
generated must be aequivalent to the powerset-lattice for IN. But this is only a part
of the story, because the pathways followed by generation matter as well. As already
indicated, the procedure can be viewed from two different perspectives: a stepwise
doubling of the number of cells at every generation, the number of generations being
n ≤ ω, or the totality of all possible combinations of zeros and ones, viz. the power
set of P(IN) = {0, 1}IN with some additional structure; this object being the simplest
possible instance of the Cantor set. The first process is simultaneously contained in the
second. We thus obtain the two kinds of infinitiy constituting a finite body: an infinity
of extended parts — the ever smaller regions of the intuitionists — which would gen-
erate when left on its own an infinitely large body. And an infinity of unextended parts
— points — which, when left on its own, would generate a body with no extension at
all. This absurdity does not arise because division generates them both together — kai
— and at once. Conclusion: Zeno’s divisional procedure can be represented by a binary
84K. Go¨del, “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?”, BPPM, p. 483. The quotation at the beginning of
this paragraph is on p. 483 of that same book.
85VLAS, p. 222, shows that of an existant only extension is considered.
86Weyl was the first to formulate this idea, but he linked binary numbers with the nodes of the tree, thus
only capturing the potential infinity encoded by it. Given his finitist a priori this was natural enough. H. Weyl,
o.c., pp. 43-54. See also Tyles, o.c., pp. 64-67.
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tree, a Zenonian semi-lattice in which the nodes represent the megala, while the micra
are given by its paths, in two different infinities, as follows:
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The measuring rod M {0, 1}IN, the Philebian set IP.
For in two ways it can be said that a distance or a period or any other continuum is
infinite [apeiron], viz., with respect to the partitions or with respect to the projecting
parts [Aristotle, Phys. Z, 2, 263a (24-26)].
For whoever divides the continuum into two halves thereby confers a double function
on the point of division, for he makes it both a beginning and an end [Phys. Θ 8, 263a
(23-25)].
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A formal langiage appropriate to describe such structures is domain theory.87 Let us
once again review some basic notions. Given is the partially ordered set (P,6). A
subset S of P is an upper set if ∀ s, t ∈ S with s 6 t : s ∈ S ⇒ t ∈ S. The symbol
↑ s denotes all elements above an s ∈ S. An element v of P is an upper bound for
S ⊆ P if for any s ∈ S : s 6 v. The least element of the set of upper bounds
of S is called the supremum (or join ) ∨S. An element t ∈ P is maximal if there is
no other element of P above it. A directed upper set or filter S of P is a nonempty
set of which every pair of elements has an upper bound in S. If the condition ↑ s
is met, S is called a principal filter. The dual notions lower (or down) set ↓ s, lower
bound, infimum (or meet) ∧S, minimal element and directed lower set or ideal appear
by reversing the order (arrows). Order in the case of Zenonian division increases with
decreasing intervals, so that (10)→ (101) implies (10) < (101). The smallest element
is unity, the measuring rod M itself. Zeno’s division operates by the application of two
simple rules of mathematical construction, two functions that map partitions on parts:
1. r1 : n −→ 2n division stepwise  ‘small’ Z;
2. r2 : n −→ 2n simultaneous division, with n 6 ω  ‘large’ Z.
Application of these two rules suffices to build Z constructively88 as the simpliest in-
stance possible of the Cantor set. The constructive reasoning used does not compell us
to an intuitionistic point of view since thanks to simultaneity we can work with actual
infinities in a logically consistent way. We discussed before the Zenonian principle of
the aequivalence of the parts and the whole.89 It is essential to translate this prin-
ciple, a direct consequence of Zeno’s deictically realistic, exhaustive procedure, into a
variant of the basic constructivist credo.90 Let us extract the principle underlying this
construction and summarise it as follows:
✓
✒
✏
✑
Zeno’s Principle (ZP): In a construction appear
only those objects that are constructed effectively,
by using rules of construction given explicitly.
The proof basically goes in three steps. Firstly, the simultaneous jump from countably
many megala to uncountably many micra can be rigorously described as the ideal com-
pletion of the small semi-lattice (Z,6) into the large semi-lattice (Z,6).91 Every node
87S. Abramski and A. Jung, “Domain Theory”, in Handbook for Logic in Computer Science, S. Abramski,
D. M. Gabbay and T.S.E. Maibaum [eds.], Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, chapters 1,2. I thank Bob Coecke
(Oxford) for clarifying discussions on this subject.
88A bit in the spirit intended by Smyth when he writes: It may be asked whether (...)
we adhere to constructive reasoning in our proofs. Actually our procedure is somewhat eclec-
tic. M.B Smyth, The Constructive Maximal Point Space and Partial Metrizability, preprint:
http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/anthonyr/dtg/papers.htm.
89W.E. Abraham, “Plurality”, Phronesis, 17, 1972, pp. 40-52.
90The importance of an explicit formulation of Zeno’s Principle was brought home to me during a discus-
sion with R. Hinnion (ULB), for it clearly demarcates the nature of the proposed representation. Propositions
with regard to CH or AC in the following pages are valid within the confines of Zeno’s construction; they do
not imply any claim with respect to, say, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatisation of set theory.
91C.q. cardinal vs. ordinal completion; W.E. Abraham, “Plurality”, pp. 40-52.
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at the ω-divisional level or, alternatively, every possible branch in the INth generation,
i.e., every element z generated by Z, represents a unique sequence f(z) = (xn)n∈ IN.
The finite ideals ↓ x can be ordered by inclusion. They all have a supremum. The
supremum of the infinite ω-chain of wich they are a part is the maximal element
↑ z ∩ Z = {z}. Appropriately enough, a constructive interpretation of the notion of
maximality as a criterion or test of fineness has been developed by Martin-lo¨f.92 Each
ω-chain defines a unique order on IN. Every ordinality on IN coincides in a unique
way with such a chain and, by virtue of ZP, no other chains do appear. This gives the
orderstructure of P(IN). Therefore the Zenonian semi-lattice (Z,6) is a directed and
complete partial order or dcpo.
But Z is a total order ≺ as well. For by the canonical numbering of the parts, an
additional order per generation is imposed, and all elements z will be comparable:
∀z, z′; z ≺ z′ ∨ z′ ≺ z ; whence (Z,≺) is a directed and complete total order or dcto.
This order catches the influence exercised on the structure by the divisional pathways.
Semantically speaking: the logic encoded by them is intensional, not extensional. This
total order is lexicograpic, i.e., according to the principle of first differences93 like in
Hausdorff’s dictionary.94 ⊳
Our next step is to establish the existence of certain bijective relationships. This demon-
stration essentially relies on the well-known Cantor-Schro¨der-Bernstein theorem. It
will not be admissible, however, to equate the left and right hand variants of the bi-
nary representations of partitions, the points of division at the rational multiples of
2−n, as in the standard case.95 They will on the contrary be used as the lefthand d and
righthand d′ closure of the adjacent, non-overlapping parts, represented by intervals,
produced in every generation. This by the way completely justifies Aristotle’s seem-
ingly enigmatic comment: For in two ways it can be said that a distance or a period or
any other continuum is infinite, viz., with respect to the partitions or with respect to the
projecting parts [Phys. Z, 2, 263a (24-26)]. In honour of Brouwer, we will call them
dubbelpunten [double points] or simply dubbels [doubles].96
M
1
←→ semi-lattice = {0, 1}IN 2←→ [0, 1] 3←→ IR
The set of all possible binary sequences f(z) is {0, 1}IN. We already saw that |{0, 1}IN|
= 2IN. Let us now remove one of every pair of doubles d and d′ that came with the
rational partitions in Z from our set of sequences, by making a canonical choice for
the lefthand side (Lc) or the righthand side (Rc) in every instance at every generation.
A canonical choice is a function fc : A ∪˙B
∼=
←− {0, 1}IN. Let d = Lc. We choose in
all cases the zero-side by Lc.
A = {(xn)n ∈ {0, 1}
IN | ∄N : ∀n > N : xn = 1}
92Discussed in M.B. Smyth, o.c., p. 3, p. 7 sq.
93K. Kuratowski and M. Mostowski, Set Theory, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 224-227.
94R. Rucker, o.c., pp. 82-83.
95P.J. Cameron, Sets, Logic an Categories, Springer, London etc., 1999, p. 128-129.
96L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., p. 56.
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A does not contain any sequences that exhibit only ones from a certain xn on. We
filter out the right hand representations of the rational multiples of 2−n. The so-called
redundancy in the binary representation of the real numbers is now removed. Our set
A is thus identical with the standard interval [0, 1]. In our case, however, the removed
sequences are not simply deleted, but carefully collected in a separate set B.
B = {(xn)n ∈ {0, 1}
IN | ∃N : ∀n > N : xn = 1}
This set contains exactly those sequences that do exhibit only ones from a certain xn
onwards; its cardinality will be |IN|. From our definition it follows that A = Bc, such
that A ∪˙B = {0, 1}IN. The cardinality of the coproduct or disjoint union A ∪˙B is
equal to the sum of the cardinalities of the sets composing it: |[0, 1]| + |IN|= 2IN. In-
deed, from Cantor’s diagonalisation argument we know that 2ℵ0 + ℵ0 = 2ℵ0 .97 Equal
powers imply aequivalence; thus we can conclude {0, 1}IN ←→ [0, 1]. By virtue of
its total order, our set {0, 1}IN is complete, and a complete set which has a countably
dense subset is a continuum. And every continuum is isomorphic to the real line.98 (The
aequivalence of [0, 1] with IR is standard and can be shown by geometrical means.) This
establishes the required aequivalences. ⊳
Thirdly regarding order. Our situation reminds us of that of infinite sets which, an equal
cardinality notwithstanding, possess different ordinalities. Plato makes plain that this
divisional procedure can proceed by “twoness”, but equally well by “threeness”, or any
other number [Philebus, 16(e)], although the examples given are always carried out by
means of aoristos duas. Therefore we will call in what follows {0, 1}IN the Philebian
set, symbolised by IP. This brings us to the theorem: the sets IP and IR possess equal
cardinality but different ordinality99:
{0, 1}IN is not order-isomorphic to [0, 1]
Now X is order-isomorphic with Y iff a bijection exists that satisfies the following
condition: k : (X,6) −→ (Y,6) with x 6 y ⇔ k(x) 6 k(y). This implies that, if
(Y,6) is dense, then (X,6) will be dense as well. Indeed, suppose Y to be dense. Let
k be an order-isomophism, such that k : X −→ Y : a < b ⇔ k(a) < k(b).
Take c < d ∈ Y then ∃! a, b ∈ X : k(a) = c, k(b) = d. But Y is dense, therefore
∃m ∈ Y : c < m < d and so a = k−1(c) ≤ k−1(m) ≤ b = k−1(d). However, we
demonstrated before that the order generated by Z is lexicographic by nature. This or-
der is preserved even for the rational doubles d and d′, for which the inequality d < d′
holds. But ∄m ∈ {0, 1}IN : d < m < d′. Then {0, 1}IN cannot be dense every-
where. By our canonical choice Lc we removed all d′ from {0, 1}IN, thus generating a
97The difficulties going with arbitrary sums of infinite powers are discussed in M. Potter, o.c., p. 170 sq.
98The conditions for completeness are either that every non-empty subset of a considered set which has
an upper bound has a supremum, or that ever non-empty subset with a lower bound has a minimum. Given
the order imposed on {0, 1}IN , the second condition is trivially fulfilled. M. Potter, o.c., pp. 119-121.
99I owe this idea to a discussion with Tim Van der Linden.
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set A which clearly has the property of being dense, in exactly the same way as [0, 1].
Therefore [0, 1] and {0, 1}IN cannot be order-isomorphic. Furthermore all ideals ↓ x
included in each unique sequence f(z) = (xn)n∈ IN in IP are finite and non-empty. A
well-order S is a total order in which every non-empty subset of S has a least element.
This is trivially the case here; whence IP is a well-order. And well-ordering is aequiv-
alent to the AC. Thus Zeno’s procedure comes about as a precept for the construction
of a well-ordered continuum! ⊳
Now consider the following statement:
Though Zermelo’s theorem assures that every set can be well-ordered, no specific con-
struction for well-ordering any uncountable set (say, the real numbers) is known. Fur-
thermore, there are sets for which no specific construction of a total order (let alone a
well-order) is known (...)100
CONCLUSION.– For Zeno’s divisional procedure we proved the following101
⋆ Divisional procedure Z ≡ (Z,≺) (simultaneity)
⋆ Immediate successor (ideal completion)
⋆ Two different kinds of infinity |IN| 6= |2IN| (Cantor’s Theorem)
⋆ Axiom of Choice (well-ordering)
⋆ M
1
←→ lattice = {0, 1}IN 2←→ [0, 1] 3←→ IR (Cantor-Bernstein)
✛
✚
✘
✙
Contrary to the above statement, our claim is that Zeno’s divisional procedure provides
a specific way to construct a well-ordered continuum isomorphic to the real number
line (though not to IR), in which Cantor’s continuum hypothesis is valid:
Z ≡ ℵ0 6= 2
ℵ0 = ℵ1
REMARK.– Every real number in this construction is represented and defined by a
unique order on the set of natural numbers, a specific subset f(z) ∈ P(IN). Moreover,
thanks to ZP all orders on IN are included, and nothing else, thence the argument is
truly constructive. The “line” formed by the divisional loci (di, d′i) is isomorphic to
the rational line. Is it possible to get the rational line per se, so that the point intervals
to which each of the (di, d′i) supplies an ending and an opening bracket contain ex-
actly the irrationals? A promising line of thought could be to generalise the divisional
100J. Dugundji, Topology, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1966, p. 35.
101C. Vidal (Sorbonne) attracted my attention to a book by A.W. Moore, The Infinite, Routledge, London
and N.Y., 2001 [1990], in which, though without invoking Zeno, a promising line of ideas is developed,
proposing a link between “infinity by addition” and “infinity by division” — clearly the same concepts as
our “stepwise” and “simultaneous” division —, the continuum hypothesis and the cardinalities of IN and IR,
but only to dismiss the possibility! The reason apparently is that it implies according to Moore a variant of
the Bernoullian fallacy, given his reference to (rational) density. See pp. 154-158 of the cited work. I want
to stress once more that Zeno does not commit any such fallacy, and refer to our own, but also to Abraham’s
analysis of Zeno’s ideas. For the latter, see Abraham’s already referenced Plurality-article.
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procedure over all prime numbers, a suggestion bestowed with some authority by tra-
dition.102 It is clear that one should include as well the powers of the primes npk, with
n, k ∈ IN. All rationals are doubly represented in that case, an apt way to enhance their
character of finite fractions. But even then not all possible intervals are covered, thanks
to the one domensional a priori implicit in the division. This not yet suffices to recover
all ordinals of ordertype zero, for we still do not cover all possible divisional intervals.
In order to do that, one should introduces multiples of powers of primes. One then of
course calls upon the availability of the natural numers, but this is no problem, since Z
generates these. This would, however, constitute a deviation of Zeno’s intentions — the
one-dimensional a priori being inhaerent to his procedure — which is neither appropri-
ate, neither necessary here. So we are left with an infinity of infitely tiny holes in Zeno’s
strange continuum. Intuitively, they are so small as to be numbers smaller than what-
ever real number given, but different from 0 : h < r with r ∈ IR. In other words, they
do not obey the Archemidean axiom: ∀x, y ∈ IR with x < y : ∃m ∈ IN : m.x > y,
which precisely excludes the existence of infinitesimally small numbers.103 Put other-
wise: h is an infinitesimal iff ∀m ∈ IN : | m.h |< 1 . This implies that, whatever they
are, they are not reals. But there are numbers in mathematics that fulfill the criterium
of being smaller than whatever given real. They are called infinitesimals. They suffer
from a bad reputation, however, for they are held responsible for the notoriously shaky
nature of the foundations on which the early calculus rests. It is well known that the
locus classicus of modern natural science, Newton’s monumental Principia [1687]104,
uses a theory of infinitesimals in a geometrically disguised manner. The underlying
theory of fluxions, which explicitly uses infinitesimals, got published only afterwards,
although it was developed twenty years before the Principia appeared. A clear exposi-
tion of the fluxion-theory cast in a geometrical framework can be found in the short tract
De Quadratura curvarum, published as an appendix to Clarke’s latin translation of the
Opticks [1706].105 That other giant, Leibniz, published his own version of the calculus
as the Nova Methodus in the Acta Eruditorum [1684].106 The notations currently in use
in calculus are introduced therein, together with a proof of Leibniz’s “chain rule”. We
already explained that an infinitesimal number is a number smaller than any given real
number, while it remains different from 0. Newton and Leibniz dealt with these quan-
tities in their attempts to formalise consistently the apparently natural notions shoring
up the newly emerging infinitesimal calculus. But they hit upon deeply rooted logi-
cal paradoxes. Berkeley with apparent taste exposed them in a devastating way in his
The analyst.107 The problem essentially boils down to the fact that something being
102J. Stenzel, o.c., p. 53 sq. refers to a passage in Book A of the Metaphysics. See especially p. 56.
103R. Courant and F. John, Introduction to Calculus and Analysis, vol. I, Wiley/Interscience, 1965,, p. 94.
104A modern edition known as the variorum edition has been edited by A. Koyre´ and I.B. Cohen, Isaac
Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, The Third Edition (1726) with variant readings,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.
105A discussion of Newton’s underlying ‘finitist’ approach towards descriptions of natural phaenomena, as
well as his reasons for sticking to the classic geometrical approach, can be found in G. Guicciardini, Reading
the Principia. The Debate on Newton’s Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687 to 1736,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999/2003, p. 27 sq.
106G.W. Leibniz, “Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis, itemque tangentibus, quae nec fractas nec
irrationales quantitates moratur, et singulare pro illis calculi genus”, Acta Eruditorum, vol. III, 1684.
107I consulted the electronic edition edited by D.R. Wilkins: http://www.maths.tcd.ie/pub/HistMath/People/
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in the sense of extended) transforms into something being not, whence his notorious
expression that they are the ghosts of departed quantities. These logical problems con-
comittant to the direct use of infinitesimals in calculus led to the development of the
Cauchy theory of limits, and the subsequent reformulation of the basic definitions of
calculus in terms of Weierstrassian ǫ–δ formalism.108 One can however doubt whether
the problem really dissappeared because an axiom of continuity has to be invoked to
render the method unambiguous. The concept of infinitesimal resurfaced again during
the second half of the twentieth century, thanks to the work of Abraham Robinson, who
explicitly considers his work as an actualisation of Leibniz’s ideas. In order to avoid
the logical problems intrinsic to them, he introduced infinitesimals defined as hyper-
real numbers by means of model theory.109 In this paper, a minimalistic, at first purely
algebraic approach will be followed based on dual or nilpotent numbers, in which the
de´tour via model theory can be avoided. It is an alternative to a more geometrical ap-
proach developed by Bell.110 It will bring about its own logical problems nevertheless,
while being entitled to a historical provenance of an ancestry comparable to the other
systems. Now the suggestion is to fill out the divisional holes by means of infinitesi-
mals. Let us follow up this suggestion.
ZENONIAN INFINITESIMALS.– Although the set IP generated by Z clearly is a
continuum, we would rather like to be certain with regard to its precise nature, for
we would like to do analysis and other things that allow us to apply mathematics on the
real world, as in the case of the paradoxes of motion. On the other hand, our problem
might at first not seem very serious, for it apparently suffices to systematically equate
the unequal objects di and d′i to get back to IR, and be able to do calculus perfectly
well. But that would bring us off the track we set out at the start, which is to stay
loyal to Zeno’s intentions as much as possible. Luckily enough a way out has been
opened up for us by Henri Poincare´. It consists of carefully distinguishing between the
different notions of “continuum” which in general are uncritically mixed up, and to
make explicit these differences formally. Developing an idea he already launched in
La science et l’hypothe`se111, Poincare´ writes: Il arrive que nous sommes capables de
distinguer deux impressions l’une de l’autre, tandis que nous ne saurions distinguer
chacune d’elles d’une meˆme troisie`me.112 We could, say, distinguish a weight of 12
grammes from one of 10 grammes, while the intermediate weight of 11 grammes would
be indistinguishable from either of both. In our experience of physical reality, there
would be a continuum between them. This amounts into the following paradoxical
definition of le continu physique:
A = B, B = C, A < C
Berkeley/Analyst/Analyst.html.
108R. Courant and F. John, o.c., vol. I, pp. 95-97.
109A. Robinson, Non-Standard Analysis, North-Holland, Amsterdam/London, 1966/1974. For Leibniz, see
p. 2; p. 260 sq. Also J.M. Henle and E.M. Kleinberg, Infinitesimal Calculus, Dover, 1979/2003.
110Nilpotent infinitesimals have been re-introduced by J.L. Bell in the realm of intuitionistic mathemat-
ics. The standard reference is: J.L. Bell, A Primer of Infinitesimal Analysis, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998.
111SHYP, p. 51 sq.
112SVAL, p. 61.
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which clearly violates the Principium Contradictionis. But suppose we enlarge our
perceptive capacities; would then the difficulty not simply disappear? No, for it would
be easy enough to find elements D, E that can be intercalated between A, B so that
A = D, D = B, A < B; B = E, E = C, B < C
and so on, ad infinitum, in analogy with infinite division. The difficulty does only re-
cede, not disappear. It is remarkable how close this comes to Brouwer’s original starting
point: we [zullen] nader ingaan op de oer-intuı¨tie der wiskunde (...) als het van qualiteit
ontdane substraat van alle waarneming van verandering, een eenheid van continu en
discreet, een mogelijkheid van samendenken van meerdere eenheden, verbonden door
een “tussen”, dat door inschakeling van nieuwe eenheden, zich nooit uitput.113 This
is why Poincare´ calls the physical continuum une ne´buleuse non re´solue. The mathe-
matical continuum will serve to resolve this cloud and thus to remove the intolerable
contradiction: c’est le continue mathe´matique qui est la ne´buleuse re´solue en e´toiles.114
That this description really catches the notion of division we explicated in Z on behalf
of Zeno is plain, because of the decisive property it shares with the latter: Celui-ci
est une e´chelle dont les e´chelons (nombres commensurables ou incommensurables115)
sont en nombre infini, mais sont exte´rieurs les un aux autres, au lieu d’empie´ter les
un sur les autres comme le font, conforme´ment a` la formule pre´ce´dente, les e´le´ments
du continu physique. Now let us give the name of Poincare´ continuity to this paradox-
ical property of the physical continuum. I remind the reader here of Aristotle’s utterly
correct observation: For whoever divides the continuum into two halves thereby confers
a double function on the point of division, for he makes it both a beginning and an end.
Our claim with respect to the difference between IR and IP can be summarised as:
the set IR is Poincare´ continuous,
and therefore represents the physical instead of the mathematical continuum, contrary
to the standard view. It is the set {0, 1}IN which, by appropriately discriminating be-
tween d and d′, resolves the unresolved nebula and thus represents the mathematical
continuum, precisely because it contains an infinity of infinitely tiny holes. We showed
however that this is indeed the case, and will now try to find a way to render the math-
ematical continuum intuitively continuous again.
We look for a notion of infinitesimals that does not treat them as the mere logical
consequence of the introduction of a special operator, as is the case with Robinson
(although we retain his notion of ‘hyperreality’), but as mathematical entities in their
own right. Infinitesimals of this kind have been introduced at the very outset of the
development of modern natural science and the calculus by Bernard Nieuwentijt, a
113we will take a closer look at the fundamental mathematical intuition (...) as the substrate to all per-
ceptions of change, stripped off all its qualities, a unity of continuous and discrete, a possibility of the
thinking-together of several individualities linked by a “between” that will never be exhausted by adding
new individualities in between. L.E.J. Brouwer, o.c., p. 43. [My translation.]
114SVAL, p. 61.
115i.e., rational or irrational numbers!
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seventeenth century Dutch mathematician and theologian.116 He defends them in a
controversy with Leibniz over the years 1694-1696 about presumed inconsistencies
in the latter’s variant of the calculus. Nieuwentijt’s main criticism obviously concerns
the use of higher order differentials.117 It thus comes close to Berkeley’s attack on the
Newtonians in his Analyst118, though on radically different grounds, for he does not
reject — as with Berkeley — Newton’s use of the potential infinite; he on the contrary
accepts (on logical and theological grounds) the actual infinite as well! Nieuwentijt’s
approach has — in certain respects — a very ‘modern’ smell about it. He was unsat-
ified by the ad hoc nature of many solutions to specific problems presented by Newton
and Leibniz. He pursued to develop a logically consistent, general foundation for the
calculus, based on a study of the properties of the infinite. This problem is related to
the ontological status of infinitesimal quantities: do they really exist or are they merely
limiting cases, i.e., finite approximations? It will be clear that in the latter case only
potential infinity is assumed, in accordance with Archimedes’s geometrical method of
exhaustion, to which both Newton and Leibniz painstakingly show their methods to
correspond.119 Nieuwentijt’s criticism is that such an approximative description cannot
supplant an exact definition, hence cannot serve as a basis for valid logical deductions
in calculus. He formulates a fundamental axiom on the basis of which infinitesimals
could be exactly defined: everything which, when multiplicated by an infinitely great
number, does not render a given [finite] number, whatever small, cannot be counted
as a being but should in the realm of geometry be considered as a pure nothing. On
this basis he formulates the arithmetical rules for the infinite. He moreover proves that
from this axiom it follows that the square of an infinitesimal — taken as the num-
ber a = A/m, with m = ∞ and A finite — must be zero. Indeed, multiplying a2
by m is by definition (Am)
2m, and this equals A
2
m , again an infinitesimal, and so by
the grounding axiom equal to 0.120 For whatever you do to get it over the border of
mathematical visibility will fail, and so it must be no-thing. Nieuwentijt thence defines
infinitesimals as follows: Si pars qualibet data minor b/m ducatur in se ipsam, vel
aliam qualibet data minorem c/m, erit productum bb/mm seu bc/mm aequale nihilo
seu non quantum. [When a certain infinitesimal part b/m is applied onto itself, or on
another infinitesimal part c/m, the product bb/mm or bc/mm will be equal to zero, or
have no quantity.]121 Although themselves different from zero, the infinitesimals are so
small that their square vanishes. Intuitively this is not so strange as it may seem at first
116I encountered this name for the first time in an article by J. L. Bell, “Infinitesimals and the Continuum”,
Mathematical Intelligencer , 17, 2, 1995, ftn 2. A more elaborate treatment in J.L. Bell, The Continuous and
the Infinitesimal in Mathematics and Philosophy, Polimetrica, Milano, 2005.
117R.H. Vermij, Secularisering en natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende en achtiende eeuw: Bernard
Nieuwetijt, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1991, p. 24 sq.; P. Mancosu, Philosophy of mathematics and mathemati-
cal practice in the seventeeth century, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1996.
118N. Guicciardini, o.c., pp. 199-200.
119N. Guicciardini, o.c., p. 164 sq.
120R.H. Vermij, o.c., p. 19. A more detailed exposition of Nieuwentijt’s mathematical methods in H. Weis-
senborn, Die Prinzipien der ho¨heren Analysis in ihrer Entwicklung von Leibniz bis auf Lagrange, als ein
historisch-kritischer Beitrag zur Geschichte der Mathematik, H.W. Schmidt, Halle, 1856.
121Bernhardi Nieuwentijt, Analysis infinitorum seu curvilineorum proprietates ex polygonorum natura de-
cuctae, Amstelaedami, Wolters, 1695, Praefatio, lemma 10. That he really has infinitesimals in mind becomes
clear from the definitions on p. 1 of his book: “data major” = “infinitam” and “data minor” = “infinitesimam”.
Thus te bigger m becomes, the smaller b/m will be.
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glance: consider the square of the real number 0, 0001! Thus the infinitesimal character
becomes a definable property in its own right. This is where the concept “nilpotency”
comes in.
Now let us look in more detail at the set of Nieuwentijt infinitesimals IB (‘B’ from
Bernard) of nilpotent numbers.122 We consider IB as a plane IR×IR in which the number
(a, b) consists of a real component a and a hyperreal component b. The latter one is the
coefficient of the infinitesimal h. Addition of two such hyperreals is component-wise:
(a+bh)+(c+dh) = (a+b)+(c+d)h. For multiplication we have: (a+bh)·(c+dh) =
ac+ adh+ bhc+ bdh2 = ac+ (ad + bc) h, or (a, b)(c, d) = (ac, ad + bc). In other
words, we multiplicate a+ bh en c+ dh as polynomes in the variable h, with h2 = 0.
This of course holds true for all multiples of h2. As we noted already, our number (0, 1)
is so small that, although itself different from 0, its square equals 0.123
Thanks to these properties, IB is a com-
a
b a+bh
Figure 1: The nilpotent number a+ bh
mutative ring with unity, which forms
an algebra over the field IR. This IR-
algebra is the ringtheoretic quotient
IR[h]/(h2) of IR[h]. IR[h] is the poly-
nome ring in the variable h, where
(h2), the ideal generated by h2, is di-
vided out, so that the ring IR[h]/(h2)
really is the ring of nilpotent num-
bers. The representation in IR × IR
allows for a geometrical interpreta-
tion of hr = a + bh for r ∈ IR, as
can be seen in figure 1. This figure
gives further information on the or-
dertopology on IB. The hyperreal part
b clearly assigns a unique position to
bh on the straight line parallel to the
ordinal through a. These parallels in their turn occupy a unique position on the ab-
scissa, assigned by a. The relation satisfies the criterion for total order: ∀hr ∈ IB :
(a, b) 6 (c, d) or (c, d) 6 (a, b). The total order on IB will be determined by means
of the first difference, so that it is not merely total, but lexicographical as well. This
is in agreement with what we obtained when dividing Zenonian-wise. It furthermore
will be possible to embed IR in IB in by means of the injection ι : IR →֒ IR × IR :
r 7→ hr with hr = (r, 0). This embedding preserves the order. Let us now return to our
initial question: given that the lexicographical order that equally governs {0, 1}IN pre-
vents the double points d < d′ from coinciding, how to fill out the gaps in IP that arise
as a consequence of their presence? Our answer will obviously be that the Nieuwen-
tijt infinitesimals lie exactly between them. But this answer implies that it should be
possible to somehow construct a viable completion of IP × IP in IB, and show that the
result remains aequivalent to Z. We are facing immediately a problem here, because,
while the number of points a on the abscissa is uncountable, we only have a countable
number of places (d, d′) available to insert what I propose to call a prime needle for
122The initial suggestion that dual or nilpotent infinitesimals are the best match for our purposes stems from
Didier Deses (VUB). Concerning the algebra, W. Lowen (Paris VII) made many valuable suggestions.
123Division can be defined by means of the adjoint. It is the inverse operation of multiplication, with the
caveat that, in order to remain consistent, b 6= 0.
ZENO’S PARADOXES. A CARDINAL PROBLEM 31
reasons that do not concern us here. But let us neglect this problem at first by arbitrar-
ily supposing that not every a possesses this power to instantiate a hyperreal monad124,
and look what happens when we insert a prime needle Di between the members of
each couple (di, d′i), thus executing graphically the construction exactly as we need it.
This construction does indeed generate the Euclidean plane, thanks to an at first glance
improbable THEOREM S proven by W. Sierpin´ski that states:
the plane is a sum of a countably infinite number of curves.
d d’
Figure 2: The nilpotent numbers complete IP× IP into IB
Since we demonstrated before the aequivalence of Z with CH, for our needs aequiv-
alence of S with the latter would do. But this is exactly Sierpin´ski’s point: to prove
that theorem S quoted above is aequivalent to CH.125 Sierpin´ski’s starts by proving the
weaker THEOREM S∗: The set of all points of the plane is itself a sum of two sets of
which one is at most countable on every straight line parallel to the ordinate, the other
one at most countable on every parallel to the abscissa. Our initial hypothesis that only
on the rational number of loci (di, d′i) the real part a will possess the power to intan-
tiate a hyperreal monad bh along the prime needle Di, Our embedding now of course
will be ǫ : IP →֒ IP × IP : r 7→ hr with hr = (r, 0), which preserves the order. But
it is far from clear yet what this exactly means in terms of the Gedanken-experiment
which is at the heart of Zeno’s procedure. Therefore we will have to elucidate further
its physical meaning, by taking a closer look at its geometrical implications. At first we
need to discuss the paradoxes of motion, and see how tehy fit into the play.
ZENONIAN PLURALITY IN THE MOTION PARADOXES.– The classical interpreta-
tion again presents us Zeno’s argumentative strategy as a dilemma, at bottom concern-
124This terminology stems from Robinson’s seminal work, and, although a bit unfashionable these days, I
insist on using it as a tribute to him. Cfr. A. Robinson, o.c., p. 57.
125W. Sierpin´ski, Hypothe`se du Continu, Z Subwencji Funduszu Kultury Narodowej, Warsawa/Lwo´w,
1934, pp. 9-12. [Reprinted by Chelsea Publishing Company 1956]
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ing the continuity of space, and, as a corrolary, the continuity of time.126 An alterntive
though related interpretation centers upon the denseness postulate for both space and
time.127 We will shortly consider the applicability of our representation Z to Zeno’s
motion paradoxes, confining ourselves to an outline of the possibility, and leaving a
more elaborate discussion for future work. It will be indicated furthermore how this
links to the question at the end of the preceding paragraph. This comes down to de-
vising an interpretation that subsumes PM under Zeno’s simultaneous and through and
through divisional procedure (as we modelled it), which indeed matches the nature of
our claim with respect to them.
Zeno’s famous Paradoxes of Motion are transmitted to us by Aristotle [Phys., Z 9,
239b], with the comment that they are notoriously difficult to refute. And indeed at-
tempts to either refute, either resolve them have been at the order of the day up to the
present: no one has ever touched Zeno without refuting him, and every century thinks
it worthwhile to refute him.128 Let it suffice to say that, however relevant in themselves
for future developments in, say, mathematics, all presumed refutations hinge on non-
Zenonian praemisses, so that, whatever it was that was refuted, it was certainly not
Zeno. Again, it is not Zeno who presupposes space or time; nor does he assume hypo-
thetical postions on their being discrete or continuous. The only thing needed to find
PM back is Zeno’s simultaneous and through and through division. Our analysis of PP
thus should be qpplicable to PM as well. The reason invariably is that “to move” im-
plies “to count the uncountable”, or, which boils down to the same, to measure implies
to apply commensurable units to incommensurable quantities.
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Figure 3: The paradoxes of motion
Bell puts it like this: Continuity and discreteness are united in the process of mea-
surement in which the continuous is expressed in terms of separate units, that is num-
bers.129 This is the fundamental point one looses out of sight when one throws actual
infinity out. One assumption implicitly underlying the execution of Zeno’s procedure
126W. C., Salmon (ed.), Zeno’s Paradoxes, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2001 [1970]. Owen succeeds in bringing
all motion paradoxes on a par by referring explicitly to the plurality problem. G.E.L. Owen, op. cit.
127A. Gru¨nbaum, o.c., p. 37 sq.
128A.N. Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy, Philosophical Library, New York, 1947.
129J.L. Bell, Oppositions and Paradoxes in Mathematics and Philosophy, [forthcoming in Axiomathes].
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— we touched it already before, but here it becomes particularly relevant — is the one-
dimensional, horizontal orientation of the divisional process. This assumption allows
Zeno to go over without any further ado from plurality at rest to plurality in motion.
When one reads the PM-fragments from this angle, the astonishing coherence of the
arguments immediately hits the eye. The problems treated by Zeno as embodied in the
four arguments given by Aristotle are, by levels of ascending perplexity130:
i) motion cannot take a start;
ii) motion, once started, cannot be completed;
iii) moving bodies passing each other are subject to the same paradoxes;
iv) motion is self-contradictory.
Zeno’s point precisely is to show that, however small the distance, the number of parts
to cross will remain the same, i.e. 2IN, while the number of partitions (steps) will never
exceed IN, and in reality be only finite. Time, being related to distance, is irrelevant
in exactly the same way as the length of our measuring rod was irrelevant. It would
moreover be quite strange that Zeno, in order to defend Parmenides’s stance with re-
spect to the deictical unreality of time, would introduce it to make his point. ‘To count
the uncountable’ is thus the motion-face of the plurality-coin, which, as the reader will
remember, can be summed up in the slogan ‘to consist out of parts with and without
magnitude’. One sees that Aristotle’s choice, far from being arbitrary, was to pick out
exactly those renderings (from an undoubtedly larger corpus) that develop the paradox
step by step, in order to lay bare its many faces, and to bring out why it is so difficult
to resolve. But although the Stagirite realised the nature of the underlying problem, he
apparently did not believe that Zeno himself did. This — together with the fact that
we know Aristotle’s analysis only from lecture notes taken by his students — explains
methinks their somewhat muddled-up phrasing and sometimes cumbersome argumen-
tative development.
The Runner (The Dichotomy) [DK 29A (25)]
[Arist., Phys., Z 9, 239b(11)] The first [argument] is the one which
declares movement to be impossible because, however near the mobile is
to any given point, it will always have to cover the half, and then the half
of that, end so without end before it gets to the goal. (...) Hence Zeno’s
argument makes a false assumption in asserting that it is impossible to
pass over an infinity or to touch one by one infinitely many in a finite
time. For there are two senses in which length and time and the continuum
in general are said to be unbounded: with respect to partition and with
respect to the extended parts. Therefore it cannot be assumed possible to
touch an infinite quantity of things [i.e., parts] in a finite time, though this
can be assumed for partition, because time itself is infinite in the same
way.
130Traditionally the numbering of the two last ones is switched, although it is clear that the Arrow concludes
Zeno’s stupendous argumentative sequence. We concord partially with Owen’s scheme.
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⊲MOTION CANNOT TAKE A START.— Aristotle reads Zeno’s argument as a reductio:
whether you have to start or arrive, seen from whatever distance you are at, the goal
to start from or to arrive at will be unattainable. Interestingly enough, in the ‘to start’
variant this version of the paradox rises problems even to contemporary limit-based
approaches. Apparently the transition of nothing into something — from standstill to
motion — is more problematic than its opposite, from something into nothing, which
in itself should arouse suspicion.131 The reason obvioulsy is that the formalisation of
the solution of the received view — finite limits to infinite Cauchy sequences do exist
— is not applicable in the ‘to start’ case. This becomes understandable when we re-
alise that the runner has to traverse 2IN distances to make even his first step! Aristotle
correctly interprets Zeno’s intentions, insofar as he admits that two kinds of infinity are
involved: one with respect to the — countable — number of partitions, one with repect
to the — uncountable — number of parts. It is well worth the effort to lay bare Aristo-
tle’s approach in some detail. First he imputes Zeno with a false assumption, viz., “that
it is impossible to pass over an infinity or to touch one by one infinitely many in a finite
time”, while we know that 1) Zeno nowhere mentions time, and 2) this is not an as-
sumption, but a distorted version of the conclusion reached to the argument on plurality
gone before. Thus Aristotle’s strategy involves two steps: to introduce ‘time’ as an un-
derlying hypothesis and to discard the plurality arguments, although he certainly was
aware of them. Even more, this same pattern turns up against all arguments on motion.
Why? The first and major reason obviously is that Aristotle does not want to expose,
but to kill off the paradoxes. This stance is exemplified in the basic axiom shoring up
both his metaphysics and his logic, the Principium Contradictionis or contradiction
principle (PC): it is not admissible that something is and is not in any sense at the same
place at the same time [Met,, γ 3, 1005b(19-26); B 2, 996b(30)].132 For Aristotle para-
doxes are a problem most urgently in need for a solution. Secondly, that solution has to
take a specific form. This follows from his criticism of the solution proposed by Plato,
who aimed at dismantling Zeno’s plurality-argument (in the form given to it according
to him by Zeno’s master, Parmenides).133 Aristotle’s reasoning apparently is that if one
were to avoid the flaws in Plato’s system, one were to avoid the paradoxes of plural-
ity as well, and turn instead to the paradoxes of motion. This, however, is impossible
without mutilating them. To attain his goal, the Stagirite proceeds in a most subtle way.
Indeed it is impossible to “touch” stepwise the infinity of parts because the infinities
involved are different. But counting is a method of time-measurement — think of the
metre in poetry or music — therefore the divisibility of time will be ‘parallel’ to that of
partition. So instead of looking at partitions and parts, let us look at partitions over time.
Aristotle most cleverly shifts our attention from (discrete) counting and (continuous)
extension to merely counting (steps) and counting (time). No wonder that the problem
131The embarrassment is plain in e.g. Clark’s commentary on the “regressive” formulation of the paradox,
see M. Clark, o.c., p. 160.
132LOEB2. For an in depth discussion, sse J. Lukasiewicz, ¨Uber den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles,
trans. J.M. Bochenski, Georg Omls Verlag, Hildesheim etc., 1993.
133K. Verelst and B. Coecke, “Early Greek Thought and Perspectives for the Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics: Preliminaries for an Ontological Approach”, in: Metadebates on Science. The Blue Book of Ein-
stein meets Magritte, G.C. Cornelis, S. Smets and J.-P. Van Bendegem, Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht,
1999, pp. 163-196.
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disappears! This is why he says that Zeno’s argument fails because time itself is infinite
“in the same way”. Moreover, however long we count, e.g., by “touching”, the number
of “touches” remains finite. You only approach infinity, you never reach it. Thus one
never trespasses the PC by making the inevitable cardinal jump that is so proper to
Zeno’s procedure. Once you introduced time, you can postpone that fatal moment as
long as you wish. This is Aristotle’s famous potential infinity. Even if a stretch of time
itself is finite, it consists of a potential infinity of very very small but nevertheless finite
parts: the faster you count, the smaller the parts. The paradox disappears because the
very large but finite number of parts of any extended body at whatever finitely remote
moment coincides to this same potential infinity, which is exactly what countability
means. You always use commensurable quantities, or in modern terms, you relate ra-
tionals to rationals. This corresponds to what we continue to do by using the notion of a
mathematical limit. You can maintain you reached the endpoint (of the racecourse, say)
because the gap that separates you from it becomes so small that you can neglect it. But
this explains as well why no explicit construction of the irrational numbers as such —
and not merely some arbitrary objects considered azquivalent to them — is available.
Go¨del remarks with sore precision: It is demonstrable that the formalism of classical
mathematics does not satisfy the vicious circle principle in its first form, since the ax-
ioms imply the existence of real numbers definable in this formalism only by reference
to all real numbers.134 Or more caustically: The calculus presupposes the calculus.135
With Zeno’s paradoxical construction one does not suffer from this kind of circularity.
The Achilles [DK 29A (26)]
[Arist., Phys., Z 9, 239b(14)] The second [argument] is the so-called
Achilles. This is that the slowest runner will never be overtaken by the
swiftest, since the pursuer must first reach the point from which the pur-
sued started, and so the slower must always be ahead. This argument is
essentially the same as that depending on dichotomy, but differs from it in
that the added lengths are not divided into halves.
⊲MOTION CANNOT COME TO ITS END.— Here the case is simple, for Aristotle com-
ments: This argument [the Achilles] is the same as the former which depends on di-
chotomia [Phys. Z, 9, 239b (20-21)]. The case is slightly more complicated by the
fact that both the moving body and the goal to attain are themselves in motion, but
the complication is not substantial, as Aristotle poinst out himself: it merely implies
that the distances to cross will not decrease symmetrically. He mentions διχoτoµǫιaν
[Phys,, Z 3, 239b(19)], symmetric two-division (in his treatment implicitly oriented
and stepwise decreasing), but takes care to make clear that even if another number of
division is used, this would not make any real difference, something we already know
from Plato’s Philebus. The received view presents us Zeno’s argumentation as flawed
by an elementary mathematical error, due to a lack of mathematical sophistication. In
accordance with Aristotle’s distorted rendering of Zeno’s argument, it is presented as
a potentially infinite sequence decreasing geometrically: Σ 1
2n
, the sum of which can
134K. Go¨del, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic”, BPPM, p. 455.
135L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, p. 130.
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Figure 4: The Received view on the motion paradoxes
very well have a finite total, because the underlying sequence converges to its finite
Cauchy-limit.136 As we already mentioned Vlastos, given his direct acquaintance with
the sources of ancient Greek thought at unease with this modern self-sufficiency, looks
for other explanations,137 and proposes alternative interpretations based on the notion
of ‘supertask’, developed in the fifthies by Thomson and Black.138 A supertask re-
quires the execution of a countable infinity of acts in a finite stretch of time. Thomson
and Black argue that such actions are — under specific circumstances — carried out
in reality, and that they can be used to explain Zeno’s motion paradoxes. But although
we ever only make finitely many steps, even if we could make countably many, the
stretches to croos would be uncountable in number. Thus a Zenonian supertask prop-
erly speaking would require an infinity of acts in no time!
The Stadium [DK 29A (28)]
[Arist., Phys., Z 9, 239b(33)] (a) The fourth is the one about the two
rows of equal bodies which move past each other in a stadium with equal
velocities in opposite directions, the one row originally stretching from the
goal [to the middle-point], the other from the middle-point [to the starting
point]. This, he thinks, involves th conclusion that half a given time is equal
to its double. The fallacy lies in assuming that a body takes an equal time
to pass with equal velocity a body that is in motion and a body of equal
size at rest (...) .
⊲ THE FIRST TWO ARGUMENTS COMBINED FOR EXTENDED BODIES.— This argu-
ment, traditionally known as the fourth argument logically is the third, because it sim-
ply combines the former two. What happens when two measuring rods — our model
for Zeno’s extended bodies, and one used in this case by Aristotle as well — pass each
other at constant velocity in opposite directions? So we now not only consider the rela-
tion rest/motion, but motion/motion as well. Of course there still is the fixed measuring
rod with respect to which division through and through takes place (and which creates
the impression of time and direction): the floor of the stadium. And this for all gener-
ations at once. The Received View here is that Zeno did not understand the (Galilean)
relativity governing the motions of bodies in inertially moving frames of reference, as
in the case of two cars crossing each other with equal speed on a high way: The unani-
mous verdict on Zeno is that he was hopelessly confused about relative velocity in this
paradox.139 But in Zeno’s description, every part at every moment faces its doubling
136R. Courant and F. John, o.c., vol. I, p. 70 sq.
137VLAS, p. 234.
138M. Black, ‘Achilles and the Tortoise’, Analysis, XI, 1950, pp. 91-101; J. Thomson, ‘Tasks and Super-
Tasks’, Analysis, XV, 1954, pp. 1-13.
139STF, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/paradox-zeno/.
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by division, whether it be in comparision to a stable measuring rod, or a rod passing by.
The problem arises from the fact that, because of simultaneous through-and-through di-
vision, “to double” here involves a transition from ordinal to cardinal, from countable
to uncountable, from potential to actual infinity. The infamous “doubling of the times”
only takes into account the potential, stepwise part of the argument. For of course, ev-
ery body, while being a continuum, “touches” (counts) the other one everywhere when
it passes (measures). It remains just the same cardinal problem. Their speed propor-
tional to each other does not change anything to this fact, analoguous to what we saw
with the Achilles: they are at every moment passing each other at infinitely many parts,
which, by facing each other’s unlimited division, count each other’s uncountability.
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Figure 5: The Stadium
Moreover, the number of partitions – steps — involved here really is (countably) infi-
nite. Aristotle’s dictum equally applies: For there are two senses in which a distance or
a period (or indeed any continuum) may be regarded as unbounded, viz., with respect
to partition and with respect to the parts. Let us stress once more that Zeno does not
imply that motion does not exist, only that it is paradoxical. Graphical representations
that do not take this fact into account do not account for Zeno’s third argument, as is
the case with all drawings based on Alexander, as given in Kirk et al..140
The Arrow [DK 29A (27)]
[Arist., Phys., Z 9, 239b(30)] The Third is that just given above, that
the flying arrow is at rest. This conclusion follows from the assumption
that time is composed of instants; for if this is not granted the conclusion
cannot be inferred.
⊲ MOTION IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY.— The Arrow radicalises the reasoning by
combining the first two arguments pointwise, so that the contradiction plainly arises.
Indeed, even in this case the doubling of parts occurs, as again the Stagirite notes. He
does nevertheless not credit Zeno with this insight. Probably because in this variant the
140KRS, p. 274.
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paradox does not leave any room for anything timelike to be smuggled in, Aristotle has
to take recourse to praemiss of the parallellism of divisibility of space and time, which
is why he introduces as an explicit assumption instants conceived as ‘time-atoms’141,
“for otherwise the conclusion will not follow” — after you have discarded actual infin-
ity, that is. He then rejects these time-atoms, and proposes his potential divisibility as
a more apt solution [Phys., Z 9, 239a(20-24)]. But of course chronons, like atoms, are
non-Zenonian. This is another nice example of Aristotle’s general neutralising strategy
with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes: to introduce a seemingly self-evident hypothesis on
Zeno’s behalf, such that his own principle of contradiction can subsequently be applied
succesfully. When parts considered are of the megala type, one can still be impressed
by seeing the motion that takes place. When looked at it from the point of view of
the mikra the paradox becomes unescapable, for one cannot see motion over an un-
extended “distance” in the unextended now. These parts in effect cannot be further
divided, which is why the atomistic point of view seems to fit in naturally. But one then
forgets an essential thing: the arrow is a finite object consisting of megala and mikra,
which nevertheless flies. The last two arguments show that, whether we consider the
megala or the mikra, the paradox remains the same. This is where the reading of the
last two arguments as a dilemma stems from. Indeed Zeno’s argumentation becomes
here somewhat of a mocking variant of the dilemma imposed on him by later times.
Considered as an absurdity, it seldomly is discussed with the zeal devoted to the other
paradoxes of motion. But once the true nature of Zeno’s paradoxes is assimilated, this
last argument reveals itself as the contrary of how it is generally perceived: a clear and
incontestable exposure of the paradoxical nature of motion and change, and not an in-
comprehensible enigma. If you let motion, conceived of as covering all systematically
smaller extended parts of a line by counting the uncountable in every single part, come
to an end by mentally letting the extension of the parts decrease to nought, then divi-
sion ‘comes to an end’ too, and the only thing that remains is the naked paradox. This
explains why this paradox in the literature has been considered as the most enigmatic
one, while it actually only sums up Zeno’s conclusion in a concise way.
GEOMETRICAL IMPLICATIONS.142– To conclude, I will give a short sketch of some
geometrical consequences — to be worked out in more detail in a subsequent paper —
which throw light on Zeno’s paradoxes from a more physical perspective, and which
allow to bring the Received View on the paradoxes of motion into the picture again. At
first an observation that serves as a guideline. We will work in the spirit of the noto-
rious Erlanger Programm, formulated by F. Klein in 1872.143 Instead of focusing on
geometric objects per se, one studies objects that stay invariant under the action of a
group of transformations. Now the algebraic expression for Nieuwentijt infinitesimals
is a first order polynome, the equation of an Euclidean straight line. Such a polynome
a+ηb can also be regarded as a point (a, b) in a two-dimensional space. The usefulness
141Developed aftewards by Diodorus Cronus. See R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories
in antiquity and the early middle ages, Duckworth, London, 1983, p. 17 sq.
142On this subject I was helped enormously in developing the ideas sketched here by some clarifying
discussions with P. Cara (VUB) and F. Buekenhout (ULB).
143F. Klein, “Vergleichende Betrachtungen u¨ber neuere geometrische Forschungen”, Mathematische An-
nalen, 43, p. 63 sq., 1893.
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of this representation is clear from the example of the complex numbers g = a + ib ,
with i2 = −1 for η = i :; their geometrical representation is the complex face
of the Euclidean plane with its accompanying static, Euclidean geometry. Let us call
a + ηb a two dimensional number144 and ask whether for other values of η a geomet-
rical representation exists.145 Is there a likely candidate to fulfill such a role for our
Nieuwentijt infinitesimals g = a + hb ; h2 = 0, with η = h ? Although less well
known, there indeed is: Galilean geometry.146 The geometry in which the motions of
bodies in classical mechanics take place is non-Euclidean! We see that the first order
polynome describing each Nieuwentijt number is the equation of a uniform linear mo-
tion in Euclidean space. The transition from static to kinematic is not so innocent as
it would seem, for it is by introducing time that one captures motion; in which case
limit-like approximations become possible, and the traditional view on PM can be re-
covered. Euclidean geometry gives us merely the situation of a particle instantenously.
Now if we take the hyperreal part bh as representing the velocity-component of the
Galilean transformation x′ = x+ vt (with h as Galilean time t ), we see that only on
the loci of the dubbels the hyperreal monads have the power to generate a space-time
worldline: the idea is that there some action is involved. We saw also that we neverthe-
less will get back the Euclidean plane. When the bh-coordinate on the time axis of a
hypereal monad will differ from zero, transition from Euclidean to Galilean geometry
takes place, i.e., the thing sitting on these coordinates is set into motion. But this way of
building Galilean geometry seems awkward, since it implies that points can transform
into straight lines. However, a geometry does exist in which certain points can explode
into “higher order” points under specific conditions, i.e., lines, or even curves. This is
Cremona geometry147, the geometry of birational transformations of the plane. Let us
summarise its basic tenets and show by analogy of argumentation that it is reasonable
to expect it to be the appropriate geometrical description of the transformations implicit
in Zeno’s approach.
Let a birational transformation ϕ be a birational function of the coordinates of x,
whereby ϕ : V −→ V ′ : x −→ x′. The function ϕ is not defined everywhere for at
certain points the denominator will become zero and singularities will arise. Thence
points do not always have an image under transformation, so they cannot be invari-
ant. Those who are not are called singular points; we can think of them as ‘black’ or
‘invisible’. We are here in the realm of algebraic geometry. In order to get rid of our di-
visions by zero, we work preferably in the completed, projective plane. In that case the
transformation can be written as homogeneous polynomials of the coordinates of x.148
Singular points are characterised by higher order ‘points’, or approximations in their
infinitesimal neighbourhoods. Such points can then be taken as transformed into curves
by division through zero. They are represented by polynomes of order n, in the same
144A suggestion by K. Lefever.
145Emch
146I.M. Yaglom, A Simple Non-Euclidean Geometry and its Physical Basis, Springer-Verlag, N. Y., 1979.
147F. Enriques, Lezioni sulla teoria geometrica delle equazioni e delle funzioni algebriche, N. Zanichelli
Editore, Bologna, 1915.
148In which case they can be simply rational. J. Tits, The Cremona Plane, Lecture notes by H. Van
Maldeghem and F. Buekenhout, VUB-ULB, 1999.
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way analysis approximates functions by means of Taylor expansions.149 In our case all
approximations will be first order polynomes representing Nieuwentijt infinitesimals at
every locus where a double [di, d′i] exists, thus transforming singular points into straight
lines. Physically speaking this comes down to derivation, another way to ascertain that
the traditional, time-dependent perspective on the paradoxes of motion is included in
our approach. Owing to Sierpin´ski’s theorem mentioned above, our completed plane
would be a special instance of the projective plane over the division ring of nilpotent
numbers IB; we will label it P2(IB) (this remains to be rigorously shown).150 Cremona
Geometry was axiomatised by J. Tits in the context of incidence geometry, in which
geometrical properties are expressed as symmetrical relations of intersection and inclu-
sion.151 In every “black point” Tits defines a tree of approximations which resembles
(Z,6). Far from being empty, the singular point appears to be a highly structured en-
tity! These trees are the foundation on which the Cremona plane can be constructed
as a building, incidence geometrically speaking. They constitute thin subgeometries,
and are called apartments.152 What is the precise nature of these apartments? Given
the strong analogy between the structures in Tits’s axiomatisation and the semi-lattices
arising from our Zeno-approach, F. Buekenhout proposed the following theorem:
The ‘thin’ Zeno-plane (the small Zeno-semilattice Z) gives the [aequiv-
alence class of] apartments in the building constituted by the Cremona
plane.
It of course remains to be demonstrated that this theorem does indeed establish the
desired link. When this works it means that the “Zeno-line” is identical to the Cremona
line. In that case one could use a kind of “Zeno microscope” to elucidate the internal
structure of the Nieuwentijt infinitesimal, which, far from being structureless, repeats
fractal-wise the Zenonian tree in its own fine structure. This could be the first step
towards an understanding of why the ‘cardinal jump’ so crucial to Zeno’s paradoxical
procedure comes about. The question then remains to be answered what the birational
transformations are under which Nieuwentijt infinitesimals are invariant. Settling this
question would bring us back to Galilean geometry, i.e., to classical mechanics, which
really is where Zeno’s paradoxes of motion belong.
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